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There is a switch from direct arms sales to military
technology transfer to produce arms in the name of self-
sufficiency. The value of domestic arms production at the
beginning of the 1980s was about 500 times higher than that
at the beginning of the 1950s. By the early 1980s, more than
50 developing countries were producing weapons . The evidence
indicates that Turkey has relatively enough arms production
potential. However, there is a technological gap which needs
to be closed. Turkey should first follow a "path strategy"
to create minimum required technological base by using some
form of military technology transfer. Then, in the efforts
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I . INTRODUCTION
The developments in military technology are so fast that
even some developed countries cannot afford to keep pace.
Therefore, technological dependence arises mainly from the
gap of technical knowledge and skill between supplier and
recipient nations. Developing countries seek to transfer




The two segments of the term "military technology
transfer" may be defined as follows:
Military technology is the understanding and application
of specific knowledge, technical information, know-how,
critical materials, unique manufacturing equipment, end
products and test equipment essential to research, development
and production of weapons systems^ comprising weapon platform
^Louscher and Salomone (1987, pp. 13-14) group twenty-seven
different major weapons systems into air, ground, sea and
missile/radar categories. Among the major air weapons include in
the typology are trainers, fighters, helicopters, light planes,
transport aircraft, and counter-insurgency aircraft. Major ground
weapons include armored personnel carriers, light tanks, medium
tanks, armored cars, artillery, infantry combat vehicles, and self-
propelled howitzers. Fast attack craft, frigates, patrol craft,
submarines, coastal patrol boats, fast patrol boats, destroyers.
(e.g., a ship, aircraft, or armored vehicle), weapons (e.g.,
gun, missile or torpedo) , and means of command and control
(Roberts, 1988, p. 25) . Figure 1 indicates that military
technology can be in the form of physical deliverables, show-
how, and information.
Transfer is the flow of military technology from a
country, other than that from which this technology
originates, to another country. (Ezegbobelu, 1986, p. 9)
It is possible to distinguish arms and process transfer.
Arms transfer entails the import of weapons and weapons
systems embodying new technology that have few or no
indigenous substitutes. A process transfer, though, entails
the import of know-how necessary for indigenous production of
needed arms. (Louscher and Salomone, 1987, p. 3)
The production of the Lockheed F-104 fighter's in European
countries may give a general idea about what technology
transfer includes. Its production required the following
technology transfers besides the supply of major components
and subsystems (Brzoska and others, 1980, p. 38):
hydroboats, and tank landing ships constitute major sea weapons.
Major missile/radar systems include anti-tank missiles, surface-








































Source! Adapted from Office of Industrial Innovation, S^ffp]y i ng or
Ac'jvltlng Technology: A Canadian Business Gvlrfp to ^trirctur iog fliid
t^eijotlating Technology Transfer AgteementSi Department of Regional
Industrial Expansion, 1986, p. 7.
Figure 1. Forms of Military Technology
Engineering drawings, parts requirements, aircraft
specifications, electrical wiring diagrams, stress
reports, performance characteristics and supporting
aerodynamic data, process specifications, material
specifications, list of ground-handling and maintenance
equipment, Lockheed's Drafting Practice Manual, flight-
test procedure cards. Pilot's Operation Handbook, flight-
test reports, weight reports, production operation
sheets, detail assembly-panel charts, tool design, lists
of suppliers of all parts, equipment, and assemblies.
Functional Test Manual, Planning Manual, Standards Tool
Manual, Manufacturing Standard Manual, Manufacturing
Process Manual, Tool Design Manual, major-assembly
sequence chart, bill of material, and an illustrated
parts catalog.
B. DEVELOPMENTS IN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY
Between 1789 and 1807, during the reign of Sultan Selim
III of the Ottoman Empire, the range of a musket was about
200 meters (m) . It took 30 seconds to load. At the end of
the nineteenth century, the musket was replaced by the
repeating rifle and the machine-gun which not only increased
the rate of fire, but also increased the range to 1000 m or
more. At the same time, quickfiring artillery superceded old
fashioned cannons (Lumsden, 1980, pp. 24-25).
Although major innovations in military technology, such
as aviation, tanks and military electronics of many kinds took
place during the Second World War (Williams, 1982, pp. 369-
382), there have also been extensive developments in
conventional military technology since the end of World War
II. Some examples follow (Leintenberg, 1973, pp. 338-339):
1. Extensive computer-controlled air-defense networks with
large, early-warning, over-the-horizon radars for
ballistic missile warning and forward emplaced radar
networks for anti-aircraft defense. Self-guided target-
seeking air-to-surface missiles.
2. Electronics and air-borne computers play a nearly
complete role in advanced combat aircraft: navigation,
reconnaissance, bad-weather operations, engaging opposing
aircraft, fire control, weapons guidance. Airborne anti-
submarine warfare has undergone enormous development,
long-range, long duration patrols, expandable sonobuoy
systems, other buoy telemetry, airborne dipped sonars,
infra-red and magnetic anomaly surveillance.
3. Advanced weapon guidance, using lasers for targeting of
many kinds of ordnance in field weapons and ground-
support aircraft. Night-time target acquisition and
fire-control devices. Radars for artillery and mortar
location
.
4. The impact of artificial intelligence on military
technology and tactics may be tremendous. It is expected
to see greater autonomy, sophistication and dispersion of
weapons systems and personnel (Martin, 1983, p. 3) .
Three specific military areas targeted for initial
application of artificial intelligence are an autonomous
land vehicle, an intelligent Pilot's Associate, and naval
battle management (Encyclopedia of Artificial
Intelligence, 1987, p. 604)
.
5. There is a potential of applying robotics to the
battlefield. It is suggested that robotics must first
replace people in hazardous jobs, such as combat, since
those people can be killed. Second, robotics should
replace people in military jobs that may not be
hazardous, such as in logistics, to decrease the overall
investment in the armed forces. Third, robotics should
be used in those applications, particularly in combat,
that can overcome the disadvantage in numbers of
personnel. (Brownstein and otht&rs, 1983, p. 171)
Improvements in the performance of fighter-bombers may
give a general idea about overall documents in military
technology after the Second World War. Aircraft speed, range,
load capabilities, and other operating characteristics have
continued to improve since World War II, as shown in Table 1.
Table 2 shows the relative capabilities of tactical attack
aircraft forces during World War II and currently in terms of
an arbitrary but meaningful measure—the potential to destroy
tanks or bridges. It is clear that although modern aircraft
are much larger and more expensive, a much smaller force can
now do much more than was possible in World War II (Deitchman,
1983, p. 45) .
Currently, the average life span of advanced military
technology, such as tank and combat aircraft, is estimated at
less than 10 years. In the case of electronics and computers,
the average life span is 5 years. Thus, at least every decade
a new generation of weapons is produced. (Steinberg, 1986,
p. 296)
On the other hand, to maintain technological superiority,
the new military systems can be costly, both in development
and in production. An illustration of military technological
development and their ever increasing unit costs is given in
Figure 2 on costs for successive generation of United States
tactical aircraft.




Combat Speed Radius Weapon Load
Aircraft Knots Nautical Miles (typical)




1944 P-51H 350 400 6 .50-cal guns
2 1,000-lb bombs
1955 M-t*" 500 600-800 2 20-mm cannon
3 store stations capable of
5,000-lb bomb load
1960 F4 B" 500° 850 16,000 lb of payload (e.g.,
11 1,000 lb bombs or bombs
plus gun pods and rockets)
1964 F-lllA" 700' Over 1,300
(Mach 1.2 at
sea level)
45,000 lb, of fuel +
weapons
8 Ftore stations + internal
bomb bay




30-mm, 6 barrel Catling
gun + 16,000 lb
payload on 11 store
stations
1980 A-16A 500° 500 1 20-mm cannon
7 store stations capable of





AV-8B 500 150 + 1 hr.
Vertical or short
talceoff & landing
9,200 lb. (bombs, gun
loiterpods, or missiles) on
9 store stations
' These are. simply Indicators of performance that do not especially
go together. Speed is less than maximum; radius with heavy weapon
load would be less than shown.
* These aircraft (as later versions) still active in the forces.
° Arbitrary ground attack speed: aircraft capable of Mach 2 performance.
"• Data as of 1976
Source: Seymour J. Deitchman, Military Power and the Advance of
Technology: General Purpose Military Forces for the 1980s and Beyond,
West'ifiew Press, 1983, p. 42.
TABLE 2. COMPARISON OF WORLD WAR II AND CURRENT TACTICAL
AIR ATTACK CAPABILITY
CATEGORY WORLD WAR II CURRENT^
Number of aircraft About 2,500 100
(P-47,P-51, Hurricane (F-4, A-7, A-
B-25, B-26) 10)
Sorties per day 0.61 1-3
per aircraft




Tank equivalents eo-TO'^ 300-800''
Damaged or (using PGMs)
destroyed by
force, per day
Sorties to destroy 20-30 1
bridge over minor (using PGMs)
river
^ Estimated
^ Depends on number of pylons, weight each can hold, and
type of PGM (precision guided munition)
" Based on estimated effectiveness of weapons. typical
accuracy, and average bomb load per sortie
"" Depending on type of aircraft and combat con ditions
Source: Seymour & Deitchman, Military Power and the Advance
of Technology : General Purpose Military Forces for the
1980s and Beyond, Westview Press, 1983, p. 45.
There are two important facts that can be observed from
Figure 2. First is the large number of new models of fighter
aircraft: 25 of them in 40 years. The other is the 100— fold
increase (in current dollars) in the cost of a single, fully
equipped, tactical aircraft. It is obvious that the latest
models are far more effective fighting machines. However, the
big increase in cost per unit has so reduced the total number
of aircraft that can be purchased that the cost effectiveness
of the superior technology becomes uncertain. (Long, 1983, p.
218)
C. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The major objective of this study is to place the issue
of the transfer of military technology to Turkey within the
general context of international transfer of military
technology to developing countries.
Recently, Turkey has been developing a number of
technological and industrial areas to improve indigenous arms
production'
.
^Indigenous arms production in which the essential stage of
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Source: F. A. Long, "Advancing Military
Technology: Recipe for an Arms Race," Current
History, May 1983, p. 218.
Figure 2. Cost Trend in Tactical Aircraft
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But the growth of the military technological base is not
sufficient. There is a "technological gap" that has to be
fulfilled. Therefore, this study is aimed to propose a




The concern of this study is the process transfer of
conventional military technology to developing countries. It
excludes the transfer of nuclear, biological and chemical
military technologies.
Mostly, sales of technical data, blueprints, production
equipment and raw materials are not incorporated in the
statistical data by Congressional Research Service, U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute and U.S. Library of Congress. Therefore,
in this study, all valuation statistics refer to the major
weapons only.
Throughout this study, the term "developing country" is
used to refer to a country having annual per capita income of
$3,000 nr less.
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E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
In this study, first, we discuss the potential of arms
production in Turkey. Then, a theoretical model, reasons,
vintages, and strategies of military technology transfer are
examined. Finally, after discussions of channels of military
technology transfer, advantages, disadvantages, and the
effects of the transfer are presented.
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II. THE POTENTIAL OF ARMS PRODUCTION IN TURKEY
A new development in the military activities of developing
countries is the growing importance attached to indigenous
arms production.
From the mid-1970s on, several factors have added impetus
in Turkey's drive for domestic arms production. These include
reducing the dependency on foreign suppliers, saving foreign
exchange, creating employment, and updating her military
technology. However, producing weapon systems relies heavily
on the nations' industrial capability, technological base and
human capital. In this chapter, we will discuss the arms
production base of Turkey emphasizing the industrial capacity.
A. ORIGINS
The Turkish defense industry began to emerge during the
Ottoman Empire, The first cannon and howitzer in history were
made during the reign of Sultan Mehmed II, the Conqueror. In
this period, Tophane-i Humayun was established to produce
cannons. Enaineers MuslihiHdin and Sarica Sekban desianed 130
cannons used during the conquest of Istanbul.
Weapons production was improved and developed during the
sovereignty of Suleyman the Magnificent. Tophane-i Humayun
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began to produce relatively modern weapons when Halil Pasha
was assigned as a consultant to the project.
Caka Bey established the first Turkish naval shipyard and
naval base in the eleventh century in Izmir.
In the seventeenth century, Hazerfen Ahmed Celebi flew
from Galata Tower in Istanbul over a distance of about 6,000
meters by using a wing-like device.
Although the Ottoman Empire was the innovator in methods
of warfare and weapons, Turkish arms production had fallen
behind its counterparts by the beginning of the twentieth
century
.
In the first years of the Republic of Turkey, military
production facilities of Istanbul, Erzurum, Eskisehir and
Ankara were reorganized in Ankara in 1921, under the General
Directorate of Military Factories (Askeri Fabrikalar Umum
Mudurlugu)
. In 1950, this establishment, in turn, reorganized
into a state economic enterprise as the General Directorate
of Mechanical and Chemical Industries (Makina ve Kimya
Endustrisi Kurumu Genel Mudurlugu—MKEK)
.
With the cooperation of Americans, the Kayseri aircraft
factory, in 1932, started the production of Curtis Hawk
fighters and 10 Fleshing trainers. Production of 15 German
Gotha 145 training and transport aircraft, 22 Polish Plz-23
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and 25 British Magister trainers followed and the production
of these aircraft continued until 1939 in Kayseri . (Akgul,
1986, p. 109)
In 1936, Nuri Demirag opened his factory in Besiktas and
an assembly shop in Yesikoy near Istanbul. In these
facilities, 15 ND-37 trainers developed by Selahattin Alan
were manufactured and used for pilot training. The ND-37 was
supposed to be followed by the twin-engine, 8-seated ND-38
which was ready for manufacturing, but work ended when the
German engineers returned to Germany. For some time, the
factory continued to produce parts for Westland Lysunder
reconnaissance aircraft but stopped manufacturing in 1943.
(Akgul, 1987, p. 194)
During the Second World War, Polish engineers emigrating
from German-occupied Poland came to Turkey. With their
cooperation, an aircraft factory was founded in Ankara,
Etimesgut, in 1941. At first, 60 Fourga Magisters were
produced. Later, under the name of the Turkish Air League
(THK) , some other aircraft and gliders were manufactured.
The aircraft factory was handed over to MKEK by law.
Following this takeover, the Turkish Air Force ordered 100
aircraft in 1953, but only 60 MKEK-4 Ugur aircraft were
manufactured. The projects of the MKEK-3 Mehmetcik jet
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trainer and Gozcu artillery reconnaissance aircraft were
prepared but manufacturing stopped in 1959. Repair and
overhaul work continued until 1965. Five of the twin-engine
THK aircraft were exported to Denmark and three Ugurs were
given to Jordan as a present. (Akgul, 1987, p. 196)
On the basis of a license from de Havilland Engines, the
THK aircraft engine factory was founded in 1945 on the basis
of a license from de-Havilland Engines to produce Gipsy major
engines. Manufacturing started in 1948, but later financing
became difficult, and the company was turned into a tractor
factory in 1955.
B. THE STRUCTURE OF THE TURKISH DEFENSE INDUSTRY
In order to improve arms production in Turkey, the Defense
Development and Support Administration (DIDA) was put into
implementation in 1985 as an umbrella organization in the
defense industry.
Defense Development and Support Administration endeavors
to provide the financial resources, with the purpose of
ensuring the selection of the most suitable technologies,
securing the necessary coordination between the public,
military and private sectors, and supporting and encouraging
new defense oriented enterprises.
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Organization in the Turkish arms production can be
classified into three categories (Akgul, 1988, pp. 106-110):
1. Government-Owned Defense Industry Plants
2. Armed Forces Plants
3. Private Enterprises
Government-owned defense industry plants are tasked to
meet the needs of the Turkish Armed Forces in the fields of
weapons, ammunition, explosives, and electronic equipment.
TUSAS Aerospace Industry is in the process of assembling
F-16 C/D combat aircraft.
The armed forces plants are used for the overhaul of
military vehicles. Capabilities include production and
maintenance of various items of equipment, components and
communications equipment. There are also naval yards which
produce and overhaul warships.
Some companies in the private sector participate in
production activities for various types of military trucks,
wheeled vehicles, various materials and equipment for the
Turkish Armed Forces.
C. REQUIREMENTS OF ARMS PR0DT7CTT0N
There are several socioeconomic and industrial factors




1 . Socioeconomic Indicators
Neuman (1984, pp. 167-170) discusses some factors that
separate weapon producer developing countries from others.
She ranks developing countries in relation to a weighted index
of military production capability derived from length of
production, production capacity, and technical capabilities





3. Size of military
4. Gross national product (GNP)
5 GNP per capita
6. Number of professional and technical workers
7 Number of industrial workers
In her article, Neuman (1984, p. 185-186) concludes
that in developing countries there exists "a hierarchically
shaped arms production system based largely on factors of
scale". Moreover, she states that "the existence of a large
military to provide an adequate market, combined with a
generous national income and sizable population to support
the necessary infrastructure, significantly affect a state's
long-term ability to produce weapon systems as well as the
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quantity and sophistication of its product" (Neuman, 1984, p.
185-186)
.
On the other hand, Looney and Frederiksen (1986, p.
746) incorporate into their analysis other factors that
Neumanns analysis excludes such as contact with the world
economy, public debt, and growth in foreign trade. In
addition, they mention that successes of a producer will
depend on a highly developed collateral industry, a supportive
government and general industrial development.
Their result indicates that "although size and
military expenditures are important in determining whether a
country will produce a major weapon, the nature of arms
production necessitates a certain economic environment for
the process to be profitable". (Looney and Frederiksen, 1986,
p. 752)
Turkey has a unique geographic location with an area
of nearly 800,000 square kilometers. The population of Turkey
is about 55 million and she has over 800,000 troops. In 1985,
the GNP of Turkey was $50,850 million and GNP per capita was
slightly over $1,000. In 1988, the total debt of Turkey was
$39, 200 million'.
'Republic of Turkey, State Planning Organization, and Central
Bank.
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Overall, Turkey allocates about 5% of its GNP and 25%
of its national budget to defense (Turkgenci, 1987/1988, p.
30) , This allocation highly stimulates the need for the
indigenous arms production.
2 . Industrial Base
Weapon systems with high technology are produced from
many different kinds of industrial metals, materials,
components and parts. A weak industrial infrastructure
together with inadequate technological level and technical
personnel impose limitations on domestic arms production.
Therefore, the industrial base, human capital and
technological base are pre-conditions for initial arms
production. (Brzoska and others, 1980, p. 38)
Arms production has technical linkages with certain
industries rather than the total industrial capability (Deger,
1986, p. 164). Industrial employment in defense production
in the United Kingdom which point to the following industries
as being the most important (Ayres, 1983, pp. 816-817)
:
1. Explosives and firearms








9. Ordinance and small arms
10. Other mechanical engineering
11. Scientific surgical and photographic instruments
12. Electrical machinery
13. Insulated wires and cables
14. Telegraph and telephone apparatus
15. Radio and other electronic apparatus
16. Other electrical goods
17. Ship-building and ship-repairing
18. Metal industries
19. Rubber
Kennedy (1974, pp. 296-297), and Wulf (1983, p. 324)
stress the importance of seven major industrial categories of
manufacturing within the International Standard Industrial
Classification (ISIC) that encompass the above list for
domestic arms production:








6. Ship-building and repairing
7. Motor vehicles
This framework is referred to as Potential Arms
Production Base (PAPB) by Wulf (1983, p. 324) and the
Potential Defense Capacity (PDC) by Kennedy (1974, p. 296)
.
Henceforth, we will use the term PAPB. If it is compared to
total manufacturing capacity, then an indication can be
obtained of the viability of a country's arms production
programs (Matthews, 1988, p. 15) . Obviously, the higher the
ratio, the greater the potential to produce weapons.
Table 3 shows the share of PAPB sectors in whole
manufacturing capacity for Turkey. If one takes employment,
output or value added as the proportion of total manufacturing
capacity in the PAPB group is considerable. This is the case
whether the index is measured in terms of employment (27.7%),
output (25.4%) or value added (20.6%).
As Table 4 indicates, Turkey has a better potential
for arms production than countries like Israel, Chile,
Indonesia, Egypt, Pakistan, Singapore and Greece, just to
mention a few which produce at least one major weapon system.
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TABLE 3. THE SHARE OF PAPB IN TOTAL MANUFACTURING IN TERMS



























































27.7% 25. 4% 20.6%
Source: Department of International Economic and Social Affairs,
Statistical Office of the United Nations, Industrial Statistics
Yearbook 1985, United Nations, Vol. 1, 1987, pp. 542, 545-546.
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TABLE 4. RANKS OF ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL CAPACITY FOR
DEFENSE INDUSTRIES
COUNTRY ACTUAL ARMS POTENTIAL FOR
PRODUCTION ARMS
PRODUCTION
1 Israel 1 6
2 India 2 3
3 Brazil 3 2
3 Yugoslavia 4 1
4 South Korea 5 4
5 Turkey 6 5
7 Indonesia 7 15
8 Egypt 8 11
9 Pakistan 9 16
10 Singapore 10 12
11 Iran 11 9
12 Colombia 12 14
13 Portugal 13 8
14 Greece 14 10
15 Venezuela 15 13
16 Nigeria 16 17
17 Chile 17 7
Source: Saadet Deger, Military Expenditure In the
Third World Countries : The Economic Effects, Routledge
& Keagen, Paul, 1986, p. 170
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In a period of about ten years, from almost zero
level, Brazil has moved to become the third largest arms
producer and seller among the Third World countries^ (Deger,
1986, p. 171)
The share of the potential defense capacity of Turkey
in total manufacturing in terms of employment, output and
value added is considerable and higher than it was for Brazil
when it was building up its defense industry in the 1960s.
(Ayres, 1983, p. 817)
There are both public and private sector enterprises
in the iron and steel industry. Public sector plants include
the steel mill of MKEK and iron-steel plants of Karabuk,
Eregli and Iskenderun. The Karabuk plant has been operating
since 1936 with a capacity of 0.6 million tons and the
Iskenderun integrated factory has been functioning since 1976
with a capacity of 2.2 million tons. The third entity is
Eregli which has a 1.8 million ton crude steel processing
capacity. Total capacity of integrated plants is 4.6 million
tons per year. (Cakmakci, 1987, p. 16)
*It is estimated that annually, Brazil sells one thousand
armored and other vehicles in transactions against oil from Middle
East and Africa. Brazil's main sales lines are the amphibian
Urutu, the Osorio tank which is similar to the U.S. M-1 model, the
Cascavel armored car and the Jaracca light reconnaissance vehicle.
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Furthermore, there are 15 private factories with a
total capacity of 2.7 million tons per year ranging from
50,000 to 1,000,000 tons each. (Cakmakci, 1987, p. 16)
The total steel production reached 4
. 9 million tons
in 1985. The export of iron-steel products was $519.8 million
in 1984 and $864 million in 1985. On the other hand, Turkey
imports semi-finished products (i.e., blum, slab), hot rolled
sheets, special quality steel, and seamless pipes in
considerable quantities. (Cakmakci, 1987, p. 17)
Since 1960, integrated aluminum, copper and zinc
facilities have been set up for the production of non-ferrous
metals. The aluminum production capacity of Turkey is about
60,000 tons per year.
Public and private plants produce light and heavy
diesel engines for vehicles in land transportation, engines
for locomotives and for all kinds of tactical and armored
vehicles .
Moreover, small and medium size hydraulic turbines,
generators and electrical motors, all kinds of gears and
transmissions, various types of gear pumps and accessories
for hydraulic equipment and control systems, all forged parts
and undercarriages of excavators, and all the special steel
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material requirements of automotive industry are produced in
Turkey
.
In the shipbuilding industry, the ship construction
capacity has reached 70,000 DWT (Cakmakci, 1987, p. 7).
Military Electronics Industry, Inc (ASELSAN) produces
VHF/FM vehicles, personnel and stationary type devices for
military purposes.
Considerable amounts of electromechanical components,
transformers, bobbins circuit elements, resistors, capacitors,
communication instruments, and industrial electrical devices
are produced in Turkey.
An automotive industry began having importance in
total production. Its efforts drew towards manufacturing
instead of assembly in the 1960s. Currently, more than 300
large establishments manufacture in this sector.
.
The
production was about 140,000 units in 1986. In the same year,
19% of the production was exported. (Cakmakci, 1987, pp. 14-
15)
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Turkey has always welcomed foreign investment^ and
especially that which is engaged in high technology
production. A major reason for this is that much of its
potential arms production capacity represents the consumer-
good machinery and assembly industries.
A large proportion of the manufacturing sector's
process machinery still has to be imported. In 1986, 31.2%
of Turkey's imports represented investment goods. The share
of industry in total export has increased from 36% in 1980 to
about 72% in 1986 (Cakmakci, 1987, pp. 1-2)
.
The design, manufacture and assembly of most weapons
requires skilled manpower. In 1984, Turkey had 117,500
engineers in various branches of engineering, more than
100,000 technicians and about 200,000 skilled workers
(Cakmakci, 1987, pp. 28-30). Scientists and engineers that
worked in research and development at the beginning of the
1980s were about 9,000 persons (Wulf, 1983, p. 327).
^The basic law regulating foreign investment in Turkey conveys
to foreign investors the same rights and privileges as to the
Turkish investors and guarantees the freedom to transfer profits,
fees and loyalties, and repatriate capital in the event of
liquidation or sale. Virtually, all sectors of business activity
in Turkey are open to foreign investment.
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3 . Productive Performance of PAPB Sectors
Between the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the
1980s, Turkey's PAPB industries, except for the iron and steel
industry, enjoyed a considerable growth. Tables 5 through 8
provide the data on the productive performance of these
industries over the period 1977-1984.
Table 5 shows that the real growth rate of the PAPB
sectors' value added amounted to an annual average of 0.7%.
Except iron and steel, and shipbuilding and repair industries,
it can be seen that all sectors produced growth. Similarly,
saving these two industries. Table 6 indicates that labor
efficiency in all sectors rose over the 7-year period.
As Table 7 demonstrates, saving the performance of
iron and steel, and metal products there was a real growth
trend for capital productivity. The remarkable 11.3% growth
in gross fixed capital formation was due to the buildup of
capacity in aircraft and shipbuilding industries.
On the other hand. Table 8 shows that the real growth
rate of the PAPB sectors' profitability was 1.6% in the period
under consideration. It was largely because of the profits
that some Western multinational companies showed no reluctance
to participate in Turkey's industrial expansion. For
instance, in 1986, the foreign investment approvals amounted
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to 1,670 million dollars and 536 foreign companies (220 of
them in manufacturing industry) have been operating according
to the foreign capital law. That same year, the foreign
capital share in total capital was 34.7%. (Cakmakci, 1987, pp.
24, 26)
4 . Weaknesses
A serious domestic supply deficiency concerns high-
precision machine tools. Although it is crucial to arms
production, the domestic machinery industry having the
capacity to produce a broad range of advanced machinery has
not developed them in Turkey. New products are mainly
introduced into the market through licensed production of
foreign designs.
In 1986, over 90% of all imports were for investment
goods and raw material (Cakmakci, 1987, p. 2) , precisely the
inputs required for arms production. Moreover, one of the
most important reasons of the negative real growth rate in
the iron and steel industry is importation.
As the discussion reveals, Turkey has a relatively
adequate manufacturing base and human capital for initial arms
production. However, there is a technological gap. In order
to fulfill this gap, Turkey has to seek the transfer of
military technology.
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TABLE 5. PRODUCTIVE PERFORMANCE OF PAPB INDUSTRIES,
1977-1984* (VALUE ADDED)
Industrial Group Value Added in Producers' Annual
Prices (billion TL) Average
growth %
1977 1979 1982 1984
Iron and Steel 20.6 36.8 96.3 153.9 -11.5
Non-ferrous Metals 3.7 11.4 31.0 73.5 1.5
Metal Products 5.0 16.4 59.5 106.6 2.7
Machinery 6.5 19.0 89.9 162.1 5.1
Electrical Machinery 6.3 16.3 70.4 178.0 7.0
Shipbuilding and 1.1 2.8 18.6 17.8 1.2
Repairing
Motor Vehicles 8.6 16.1 77.3 161.4 0.9
*Data for value added expressed in current prices: the annual
average growth rates are in constant prices (1963=100)
Source: Department of International Economic and Social
Affairs, Statistics Office of the United Nations, JDdustriai
Statistics Yearbook 1981, United Nations, Vol. 1, 1983, p.
525; and Industrial Statistics Yearbook 1985, United Nations,
Vol. 1, 1987, p. 546.
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TABLE 6. PRODUCTIVE PERFORMANCE OF PAPB INDUSTRIES,
1977-1984 (AVERAGE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES)
Industrial Group Average Number of Employees Annual
(thousands) Average
growth %








Motor Vehicles 32.4 31.0 30.1 33.8 0.6
Source: Department of International Economic and Social
Affairs, Statistics Office of the United Nations, Industrial
Statistics Yearbook 1981, United Nations, Vol. 1, 1983, p.
523; and Industrial Statistics Yearbook 1985, United Nations,
Vol. 1, 1987, p. 542.
55.1 60.2 55.1 46.0 -2.5
19.7 20.4 21.6 21.6 1.3
31.0 37.2 40.9 37.5 2.8
40.2 46.4 52.4 47.6 2.4
28.1 31.1 33.1 35.0 3.2
7.1 8.8 8.9 6.0 -2.4
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TABLE 7. PRODUCTIVE PERFORMANCE OF PAPB INDUSTRIES,
1977-1984* (GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION)
Industrial Group Gross Fixed Capital Formation Annual
(million TL) Average
Growth %
1977 1979 1982 1984
Iron and Steel 1,801 10,024 20,309 20,950 -5.8
Non-ferrous Metals 543 695 6, 152 25,253 14.9
Metal Products 636 1,311 6,417 10,707 -0.7
Machinery 693 1,831 9, 982 22, 624 9.2
Electrical Machinery 543 762 6, 809 30,083 17.8
Shipbuilding and 29 121 2,769 3, 653 32.4
Repairing
Motor Vehicles 1, 195 2, 920 14,475 43, 957 11 .1
*Data for gross fixed capital formation is expressed in current
prices: the annual average growth rates are in constant prices
(1963=100)
Source: Department of International Economic and Social Affairs,
Statistics Office of the United Nations, Industrial Statistics
Yearbook 1981, United Nations, Vol. 1, 1983, p. 525; and
Industrial Statistics Yearbook 1965, United Nations, Vol. 1,
1987, p. 546.
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TABLE 8. PRODUCTIVE PERFORMANCE OF PAPB INDUSTRIES,
1977-1984* (VALUE OF STOCKS)
Industrial Group Value of Stocks at the End
of period (billion TL)





































































5.12 12.61 41.7 85.8 -0.7
*Data for value of stocks at the end of period is expressed
in current prices: the annual average growth rates are in
constant prices (1963=100)
Source: Department of International Economic and Social
Affairs, Statistics Office of the United Nations, Industrial
Statistics Yearbook 1981, United Nations, Vol. 1, 1983, p.
526; and Industrial Statistics Yearbook 1985, United
Nations, Vol. 1, 1987, p. 547.
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III. MILITARY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: AN OVERVIEW
This chapter analyzes mainly a theoretical model, reasons,
sources, vintage and strategies of military technology
transfer.
A. THEORETICAL MODEL OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
Deger (1986, pp. 178-179) has introduced a theoretical
model to explain the military technology transfer from
developed to developing countries.
Let us consider Figure 3. There exists a military
technology where the output of arms (D) is produced by two
factors: capital (K) and labor (L) . Suppose prior to
technical change there is a high possibility of substitution
between K and L, so that D can be produced by a widely
different range of capital-labor ratios. The usual shaped
isoquant AB in Figure 3 represents current technology.
Suppose this technology is freely available. A developed
country with higher capital endowments will choose to produce
output at El with the slope of CD giving th^ wage-rental
ration. The factors in use will be K^ and Lp . An
underdeveloped country with abundant labor and lower wage-
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rental ratio will produce at E^ using more labor (Lp) and less
capital (Kp) .
Given the sophistication and costs of military research,
most technical progress in defense production takes place in
developed countries. Therefore, when technology is induced
in DCs, they will work to move out the production frontier
around the point at which they are currently located,
developing a very specialized technology appropriate to their
own wage-rental ration. In the model, in the limit, there
will be an L-shaped isoquant where there is no possibility of
substitution between the two factors. Since the innovation
comes from the economy where wage rental is high, it is
expected that the vertex of the isoquant which is the most
efficient point will be at E,. Thus, the technology will be
useful for the country having low labor but high capital
stocks. The total effect of DC-induced innovation and the
shrinking of the substitution possibility will give a new
isoquant of the type GE^ H. (Deger, 1986, p. 178) It is
obvious that, this new technology is inappropriate for
developing countries, unlike the old one.
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Source: Saadet Deger, Military Expenditure in
Third World Countries : The Economic Effects, Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1986, p. 178.
Figure 3. Theoretical Model of Military Technology
Transfer
In order to use techniques most efficiently, a developing
country might have to shed labor and create unemployment, or
alternatively, at Lp, increase capital stock substantially to
reach the relevant optimum point of the isoquants. Clearly,
inappropriate technology is the bane of developing countries.
This is especially true in military-oriented fields, where
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technical progress is faster, usually induced in developing
countries with more investment and, research and development
infrastructure, often needs to be imported without control or
adaptation, and involves massive resource costs, especially
the inputs which are in short supply. (Deger, 1986, p. 179)
From a purely efficient point of view, it may be optimal
for developing countries to choose the most efficient
technology. However, increasing proportions being spent on
new vintages will, by increasing obsolescence, make the
resource cost prohibitive. At the same time, the
macroeconomic cost of inappropriate technology will have to
be considered also. Labor-surplus developing countries might
be saddled by highly capital-intensive methods of production
leading to a choice of techniques incompatible with endowments
and factor-price ratios. Thus, although military technology
transfer may have beneficial effects, the costs will be high.
B. REASONS FOR MILITARY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
The three major reasons for transferring military
technology to developing countries can be stated as follows:
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1. The Desire for Domestic Arms Production
2. Economic Factors
3. Technological Characteristics of Arms Production
1 . The Desire for Domestic Arms Production
Developing countries have jointly comprised the
world's leading market for conventional weapons, accounting
for as much as three-quarters of the international trade in
military systems. Between 1978-1985, the developing countries
ordered $258 billion (in current dollars) worth of weapons
systems and ammunition from arms suppliers and actually
received $220 billion worth of such equipment. In these
transactions, 13,960 tanks and self-propelled cannons, 27,605
armored personnel carriers, 4,005 supersonic combat aircraft,
and 34,948 surface-to-air missiles were included. (Grimmett,
1986, pp. 30, 36)
Although these transfers resulted in a significant
shift in military technology from developed to developing
countries in the form of hardware, there is an apparent
decline in arms purchases by the developing countries. From
a high point of $43.6 billion in 1982, developing countries
orders for new weapons dropped to $28.2 billion in 1983, $32.2
billion in 1984, and $29.9 billion in 1985 (in current
dollars) (Grimmett, 1986, p. 30)
.
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Accompanying this contraction in the total market
share of the six major suppliers, there have been some
important shifts in the relative market dominance of the
individual suppliers. Most noticeable in this regard is a
shift in the respective shares of the two superpowers on one
hand and the four European suppliers on the other. Between
1973 and 1980, the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union jointly
received 66 percent of all developing countries orders while
Europeans received 25 percent. However, in 1984, the
superpowers' share had dropped to 55 percent while the
Europeans' share rose to 32 percent. (Klare, 1987, p. 1262)
On the other hand, the annual value of the production
of weapon systems in developing countries has grown
dramatically between 1950 and 1984. In 1950, the production
of weapons was valued at nearly 2.3 million (in constant 1975
prices) or roughly equivalent to the cost in the mid-1980s of
one main battle tank. However, in 1984, this value was about
500 times higher (Brzoska and Ohlson, 1986a, p. 7) .
Although these developing countries continue to rely
on the major developing countries for high-performance jet
aircraft and other sophisticated military systems which exceed
their domestic manufacturing capabilities, they have become
relatively self-sufficient in the production of small arms
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artillery, trainer and counter-insurgency aircraft, and other
basic items. (Klare, 1987, p. 1267)
As Table 9 indicates, ten developing countries now
produce fighters, eight produce helicopters, six produce
battle tanks, eight produce missiles, and six produce major
fighting ships
.
As seen in Table 10, at the beginning of this decade,
perhaps the most important development is the gradual growth
in arms sales by developing countries which lack the extensive
production capabilities of the six major suppliers. However,
they have succeeded in striking out a significant market as
suppliers of inexpensive or specialized equipment.
As the data suggests, there is a switch from direct
arms sales to military technology transfer such as blueprints
and technical information to produce arms in the name of self-
sufficiency .
41
















X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X
(X) (X)

































X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X .X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X


























X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
(X) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
. X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X
(X (X) <x>
X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X















(X) (X) (X) (X) (X) (X) (X) (X) (X) (X) (X) (X) (X) (X) (X) (X)xxxxxxxx
X X X X X X






















































'Years are for actual production (excluding assembly)
.
''Fighter aircraft include COIN roles, exclude trainers.
'Destroyers, frigates, corvettes and submarines
( ) uncertain data v
Source: M. Brzoska and T. Ohlson, "Arms Production in the Third World: ar
Overview," in M. Brzoska and T. Ohlson, eds
.
, Arms jProduction in the Thirc
Korld, Taylor S Francis, 1986a, p. 23.
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TABLE 10. MAJOR SUPPLIERS OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS AMONG
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1979-1983
COUNTRY VALUE OF TRANSFERS PERCENTAGE OF
(Current U.S. Doliars WORLD TOTAL
in Billions)
Czechoslovakia 3, 950 2.3
China 3,320 1.0
Poland 3,100 1.8
Korea, South 2,010 1.2
Romania 1,980 1.2
Korea, North 1,805 1.1
Israel 1,360 0.8
Yugoslavia 1,340 0.8
Spain 1, 115 0.7
Bulgaria 840 0.5
Brazil 830 0.5
Source: U. S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, World
Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, U. S. Printing
Office, Washington, D.C., 1985, p. 78.
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Given the high costs and technical difficulties, many
analysts have dismissed the possibilities of achieving total
self-sufficiency in domestic arms production. However,
producing weapons in the name of self-sufficiency is still the
most important raison d'etre for transferring military
technology in developing countries. (Brzoska and others, 1980,
p. 87)
Indigenous military production is motivated mainly by
the desire to reduce dependency on foreign arms suppliers
(Klare, 1987, p. 1266). As one researcher states, "almost
all of the countries that have embarked upon creating an arms-
manufacturing industry have basically done this for political
and security reasons. They wish to become more independent"
(Pierre, 1982, p. 10)
.
However, another analyst observed that most of those
developing countries with indigenous arms industries are
generally dependent to a greater or lesser degree on imports
of military technology--in the form of blueprints, technical
assistance, specialized machinery and parts from the major
developed countries. (Neuman, 1984, p. 162)
2 . Economic Factors
Another motive for transferring military technology
is that military technology and domestic arms production
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benefit the economy of developing countries^. The main
economic considerations of military technology transfer
follow;
First, investment in the design and production of
technologically advanced weapons in developing countries is
seen as a means of creating a national technological
infrastructure which later can be transferred to the civil
sector. (Rivkin, 1968, pp. 61-78) Second, developing
countries often suffer from excess capacity. Thus military
production may have backward linkages and create demand for
inputs produced by horizontally integrated civilian industrial
systems. Finally, it is assumed that foreign exchange will
be saved and employment created. (Deger, 1986, p. 154)
3 . Technological Characteristics of the Arms Production
Establishing military-industrial complex for domestic
arms production would have certain characteristics that force
developing countries to transfer military technology (Lock and
Wulf, 1979, p. 218)
:
1. Steadily increasing military research and development
which result in ever more complex weapons systems.
2. A rising rate of weapon innovation and development which
leads to rapid technological obsolescence, and
^For more discussion of economic effects of military
technology transfer to developing countries see: Saunders (1976,
pp. 204-212), Lock and Wulf (1977, pp. 127-136), and Wionczek
(1986, pp. 47-58) .
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"^
. Tncreasina complexii-y of weapon systems whirh reduces
the possibility of "copying" and which allows for
effective control of the technology by the licenser over
a considerable period of time.
This dependence on military technology transfer and
skills has become a significant factor in the global military
trade
.
C. SOURCES OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY
A focus on licensed production of military products
provides a more clear opportunity to examine the sources of
military technology^.
Table 11 shows that a small number of countries dominates
the sale of military production licenses for major weapons
systems. The United States of America (USA), the United
Kingdom (UK) , France (FR) , the Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG) and the Soviet Union (USSR) together account for nearly
85 percent of all licenses sold to developing countries during
the 35 year period under consideration. With respect to the
number of production licenses granted, the USA is the most
diversified supplier. The USA has only nine recipient
countries. This is the same number of licenses as for FRG and
^Licensed production is the most clear evidence of a military
technology transfer. Although data concerning licenses are scarce,
they are more available than data concerning other channels of
military technology transfer. (Louscher and Salomone, 1987, p. 4)
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the UK, and one fewer than France. The main recipient
countries of the USA military technology are South Korea and
Taiwan
.
TABLE 11 MATRIX OF LICENSED-PRODUCTION PROJECTS FOR MAJOR
WEAPONS, 1950-1984
LICENSER
USA UK FR FRG USSR ITALY SPAIN ISRAEL OTHERS TOTAL
BY LICENSEE
Algeria 1 0.5" 0.5" 2
Argentina 2 1 1 3 1 8
Brazil 1 2 2 1 1 7
Chile 4 1 1 1 7
Egypt 3 3 1 1 8
India 8 5 3 7 23
Indonesia 1 2 2.5" 1 0.5" 7
Iran 4* 4
Israel 2 1 3
North Korea 5.5" 0.5" 6
South Korea 10 1 11
Malaysia 2 2
Pakistan 1 1 1 3
Peru 1 1 1 3
Philippines 1 1 1 3
Singapore 5 2 7
South Africa 4 2 1 7
Taiwan 5 2 7
Thailand 1 1 2
Others 1 1 1 3
TOTAL 30 22 21 17.5 13 5 4 3 7.5 123
BY WEAPON
CATEGORY
Aircraft 15 6 12 4.5^ 5 3 3 3.5" 52
Armored Veh 3 2 4 1 4 1 3 18
Missiles 2 1 2 3 1 1 10
Ships 10 13 3 9 3 1 1 2 1 43
* All cancelled before sta rt of production
.
" Split in order to indicate two design coun tries
Source: M. Brzoska and T. Ohlson, "Arms Production in the Third World: An
Overview," in M. Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, eds . , Arms Production in the
Third World, SIPRI, Taylor 6 Francis, Philadelphia, 1986a, p. 26.
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On the other hand, only India and North Korea use the
military technology of the USSR. India is also an important
market for British and French military technology. Israel
not only produces weapons under license, but also has become
a supplier of military technology such as transfer of ships
to South Africa, and ships and missiles to Taiwan.
Most licenses, 42 percent are for aircraft production
technology. While the USA, the UK and FRG dominate the supply
of annual technology, the USA and France together account for
52 percent of the aircraft licenses. Not only are licenses
for the production of armored vehicles less frequent, but also
in general their production is relatively lesser.
D. THE VINTAGE OF TRANSFERRED MILITARY TECHNOLOGY
There is a lengthy time lag between military design and
military production or between production start and initial
deployment of the weapon systems in developing countries
.
This time lag is a measure of the technological level of the
arms production process. Another such measure is the vintage
of the technology used. (Brzoska and Ohlson, 1986a, p. 23)
Generally, the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI) data show that mature technologies are often
easier for developing countries to master and that they are
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also less restricted by the original owners of the technology
(SIPRI, 1987, pp. 270-282) .
As shown in Table 12, such vintage comparison can be made
for weapons produced under license. This shows that the
technologies transferred are of varying vintages and that
sophisticated and more or less obsolete technologies are being
utilized side by side.
On the average and over time, for all weapons produced
under license, the vintage gap has neither increased nor
decreased. But there are marked differences when
technological sophistication is singled out. When simple
technologies are transferred, the vintage gap is very short.
For instance, small patrol craft designs transferred from the
Soviet Union to North Korea, or British and German designs to
Singapore or American light-plane designs to Chile are of this
kind. However, the vintage gap increases when more advanced
technology is transferred (Brzoska and Ohlson, 1986a, p. 24)
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TABLE 12. VINTAGE OF SELECTED ADVANCED MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS
PRODUCED UNDER LICENSE
Year of Year of
Initial Initial
Product- Product-
ion in ion in Vintage
Licensing Licensee Gap
Licenser Company Designation License Country (Years)
AIRCRAFT
USSR 1956 MIG-21 India 1966 10
Italy 1957 MN-326 Brazil 1971 14
FRG 1969 Bo-105 Indonesia 1976 7
France 1970 SA-315 Lama Brazil 1979 9
UK 1971 Jaguar India 1981 10




France 1975 Alpha Jet Egypt 1982 7
ARMORED VEHICLES
USSR 1958 T-55 North Korea 1974 16
USSR 1971 T-72 India 1984 13
Switzerland 1974 Piranha Chile 1981 7
USA 1974 M-109-A2 South Korea 1984 10
MISSILES
USSR (1958) AA-2Atoll India 1968 (10)
frg' 1960 Cobra-2000 Brazil 1975 15
UK 1968 Swingf ire Egypt 1978 10











FRG 1973 Type 209/3 Brazil 1982 9
( ) uncertain data.
Source: M. Brzoska and T. Ohlson, "Arms Production in the Third
World: An Overview," in M. brzoska and T. Ohlson, eds . , Arms
Production in the Third World, SIPRI, Taylor & Francis, 1986a, p.
24.
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Table 13 shows an approximation of the technological level
that can be obtained by comparing start of design studies with
deployment year for domestically designed weapons. This
average time lag is about seven years for aircraft, about five
years for armored vehicles, about six years for missiles and
nearly three years for ships. The level of sophistication
also proves to be the decisive factor. For more complex
weapons the time lag is above these averages. (Brzoska and
Ohlson, 1986a, p. 25)
From a purely strategic efficiency point of view,
developing countries may receive optimum benefit from
transferring the highly sophisticated military technology.
However, since there is an increasing rate of obsolescence
over time, increasing proportions being spent on new vintages
will make the resource cost prohibitive. The macroeconomic
cost of military technology must be considered too. (Deger,
1986, p. 179)
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TABLE 13. DESIGN DEPLOYMENT TIME LAG FOR SELECTED ADVANCED








































































^ British design from 1970; first Brazi
down in 1972.
^ Stretched version of UK-designed Lean





Source: M. Brzoska and T. Ohlson, "Arms Production in the
Third World: An Overview," in M. Brzoska and T. Ohlson,
eds . . Arms Production in the Third World, SIPPI, Taylor &
Francis, 1986a, p. 25.
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I
E. MEASURES RELATED TO CONTROL MILITARY TECHNOLOGY
The Coordinating Cominittee for Multilateral E::port
Controls (COCOM) includes Japan and all of NATO except
Iceland. It is intended to act on a unified, allied level to
halt the export of high tech gear to the Soviet block and
China. (Gross, 1988, p. DS7) It maintains Military Critical
Technology lists that are forbidden for sale to the East.
(Appendix A)
.
This list includes most of the highly advanced electronic
chip techniques, for they are integral parts of next-
generation weapon systems that use astounding computational
speeds and new storage and retrieval successes. (Roberts,
1988, p. 9)
There are some approaches to the control of the
international transfer of arms and military technology. They
are divided into unilateral, bilateral and multilateral
measures. (Vayrynen, 1978/1979, pp. 91-92)
1 . Unilateral Measures
These measures refer to decisions by one country to
slow down it's arms sales, concessional or not, and aid. In
this category of measures one must also include various
licensing and other administrative arrangements which have
been developed, especially in capitalist countries, to enhance
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the ability of government to supervise the arms sales carried
out by private arms manufacturers. However, unilateral
measures are sufficient only in a situation in which one
supplier has a monopoly in the international arms market. As
this seldom happens, and definitely not recently, bilateral
and multilateral arrangements are also needed.
2 . Bilateral Measures
These measures mean a decision by any two suppliers
to agree upon joint principles and arrangements to restrict
the transfer of arms and military technology abroad. These
restraints are naturally more effective if these nations
account for a substantial share in the arms market.
3 . Multilateral Measures
These measures can be divided into two principal
types. Those carried out by international organizations,
either regional or international, and those concluded between
governments outside this kind of organizational framework.
Thus far, only the control measures on the supplier
side have been discussed, but control measures can be taken
at the recipient end also by importers of arms deciding to
apply restrictions. They may be taken unilaterally, when a
nation decides, often for economic reasons, to stop or reduce
the import of arms . On the other hand, they may be taken
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bilaterally by two rival countries trying to reach an
agreement not to import weapons or exclude certain types of
arms from imports. Finally, multilateral restrictions may
take place, for example, through regional agreements to
restrict or abolish the inflow of arms into the region
concerned. (Vayrynen, 1978/1979, p. 92)
By considering these two dimensions of control
arrangements, it is possible to develop a sixfold typology
represented by Table 14.
TABLE 14. RESTRAINTS ON TRANSFER OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY
MEASURES UNILATERAL BILATERAL MULTILATERAL
CONTROL MEASURES MEASURES MEASURES






Import Control Unilateral Bilateral Multilateral
decisions agreements to agreements
to restrict restrict imports to restrict
imports imports
Source: R. Vayrynen, "Curbing International Transfers of Arms
and Military Technology," Alternatives, IV, 1978/1979, p. 92.
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F. STRATEGIES FOR MILITARY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
"Path" and "engineering" are the two major strategies used
by developing countries to acquire military technologies.
1 . Path Strategy
In the path strategy, military technology transfer
moves through several steps. The following suggestive steps
are the learning states which are likely in the transfer of
military technology®. Any country may be at different steps
with regard to different technologies. For instance, Turkish
fighter-bomber production is more dependent upon foreign
design and components than is shipbuilding.
a. Stop OnB: MalntsnancB and Repair of TranaforrBd
Systarns
The recipient country develops a repertoire of
maintenance capabilities. It learns how to repair, maintain
and rebuild foreign equipment. Domestic civilian industries
transfer this type of information or foreign suppliers provide
it to promote domestic skills.
®The path strategy of military technology transfer has been
discussed in various forms and combinations in the defense
literature, for example, see: Louscher and Salomone, 1987, pp. 3-
4), Church (1984, p. 10), and Tuami and Vayrynen (1982, pp. 118-
120) .
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b. Step Two: Assembly of Subayatema from Imported
Component a
At this step, manufacturing capabilities are
expanded to domestic assembly under license of component
packages provided from major industrial suppliers. Licensed
assembly in the military production is almost totally
dependent on foreign design and foreign components.
c. Step Three: Final Production of the Weapon Syatem
and Production of Baaic Componenta
At the third step, the recipient country develops
a capability to manufacture basic components of a weapon
system designed by a supplier, as well as to provide final
assembly of the weapon system. Foreign technical assistance
is provided for the establishment organization and operation
of facilities to produce or to assemble components, or end
items of foreign designed equipment.
d. Step Four: Production Uaing Imported Deaign
Domestic arms production starts by using imported
weapon designs in the fourth step. Also, production can be
accomplished through reverse engineering of foreign weapons.
The recipient country develops an engineering ability to
modify technology designed by a supplier. This capability,
combined with the production knowledge, industrial
organization, and technical skills acquired through licensing.
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coproduction, foreign design assistance and joint venture
permit the production of weapon systems.
e. StBp Fxvb: Tho Capability to Design Weapon
Syatema Indigenously
This step assumes that the knowledge and
capabilities to produce a significant number of major
components exists. Although there is minimal dependence on
foreign sources for design, organizational knowledge,
technical skills, or components, critical technical and
organizational skills for end item assembly are required.
f. Step Six: Production Based on Local Research and
Design of New System
At the sixth step, through transferring
military technology, a country achieves capability not only
to design, but also to manufacture weapon systems using all
domestic components. This stage marks true self-
sufficiency in military production, and it is the ultimate
objective of military technology transfer process.
2 . Engineering Strategy
The view that military technology transfer should
follow the steps that lead to self-sufficiency in military
production is still predominant among developing countries.
However, especially with respect to latter steps, there are
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two main reasons that undermine path strategy. (Brzoska and
Ohlson, 1986b, p. 283)
First, the developments in military technology are
so fast that even many developed nations which have outlays
on research and development cannot afford to keep up with
them. Since the rate of technological obsolescence is
accelerating, there is a need for more frequent replacement
of products and for product improvement programs. As a
rule, beyond a certain point the technical problems of
import substituting are substantial.
Dependence on imported know-how and materials
normally increases with the degree of sophistication of the
weapons. Attempts to increase the domestic content per
unit of output also often lead to a steep rise in costs.
Second, the concept of self-sufficiency has lost
much of its meaning during the past two decades. This is
true even for most of the developed countries. For
instance, Japanese, German, and Swedish aircraft have
engines that are designed in other countries. Only arms
producers in the United States and the Soviet Union managed
largely to avoid having to use foreign components.
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Therefore, after creating an adequate industrial
and technological base, a developing country may replace
the path strategy with engineering strategy. The two types
of engineering strategy are "add-on engineering" and "add-
up engineering"
.
Add-on engineering refers to the adaptation of an
existing weapon system to specific needs by changing
components, adding features or taking them away, and
trying to incorporate as many indigenous parts as
possible. (Brzoska, 1986, p. 206)
In other words, it is an updating, upgrading,
improving and an adapting of existing weapons technologies
(Matthews, 1988, p. 12) . In the early 1960s, South Africa
first produced French AML vehicles under license. Then,
since the early 1980s, by using add-on engineering
strategy, it has produced the Eland armored cars. Israeli
combat aircraft Kfir and Nesher, are also the result of
this strategy using French Mirage blueprints. The Shafrir
missile is based on the Sidewinder. The Egyptian Early
Bird missile is based on the Soviet SA-2; and the October
class fast attack craft in the Egyptian Navy largely
resembles the Soviet Komar Class. (Brzoska, 1986, p. 284)
60
On the other hand,
Add-up engineering is more demanding in terms of
technical know-how and previous production
experience ... The idea is to raise sources of supply
throughout the world to integrate imported components
into a new and functioning weapon system (Brzoska, 1986,
p. 284) .
Brazilian armored vehicles from Engesa, aircraft
from Embraer, South Korean howitzers and ships, and
Taiwanese missiles and artillery are designed by using add-
up engineering transfer strategy. This strategy can also
be used with respect to "simpler" military products such as
the production of jeeps and trucks in the Philippines.
(Brzoska, 1986, p. 284)
Implementation of add-on and add-up engineering
strategies require a certain level of technological base.
Therefore, some channels of technology transfer should be
used to acquire that capacity.
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IV. CHANNELS OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
Throughout the literature, the channels of technology
transfer have been classified according to different
criteria^. For the purpose of this study, we have
classified them according to the degree of participation of
the recipient country in the transfer process and the
existence of a continuous relation over time, involving a
certain level of division of labor and risk-sharing between
the supplier and the recipient countries. According to
this criterion, military technology transfer channels can
be classified under four broad categories.^"
1. Licensed production agreements
2. Coproduction agreements
^For those distinctions see: Spencer (1967, pp. 157-159),
Robock and Calkins (1980, pp. 6-7), Liebrenz (1982), White (1983,
pp. 16-25), and Office of Industrial Innovation (1986, pp. 27-40).
^°Other channels of military technology transfer will not be
discussed separately in this study for three reasons. First,
channels such as training, education and consult inq are often
included under the heading of "show-how" in the agreements of the
above-mentioned four categories. Second, although military
presence in one country has impact of upgrading technical
potentials, for the purpose of this study, it is not a relevant
transfer channel. Finally, as a result of economic considerations,
military assistance programs are no longer as important transfer
channels of military technology as before.
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3. Joint venture agreements
4. Foreign design assistance
Although military technology transfer has beneficial
effects, the costs are extremely high. In order to lessen
the outflow of foreign currency required, some arrangements
have been made. The term "offset" is used, in this study,
as a generic word to refer to all compensatory arrangements
practiced in the transfer of military technology .^^
Therefore, each of the above mentioned channels may be
thought of as a direct offset. Moreover, these mechanisms
are not mutually exclusive and military technology transfer
agreement may incorporate elements from each of them^^. For
instance, the Turkish offset agreement with General
Dynamics is a joint venture in nature, but it constitutes
the coproduction of 160 F-16 C/D combat aircraft too.
While licensed production, coproduction, joint venture
and foreign design assistance agreements explicitly entail
^^For the detailed discussion of offsets, see: Welk (1984,
pp. 20-23), Brzoska and uhlson (1985, pp. 130-1?!)), tJeuman (1985,
pp. 189-213), Church (1984, pp. 9-13), and Hammend (1987, pp. 173-
185) .
^^In the literature, the terms "offset", "coproduction",
"licensed production", "joint venture", and "foreign design
assistance" are used interchangeably. For example, see: Neuman
(1985, pp. 183-185), and Louscher and Salomone (1987, p. 3).
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the transferring of military technology to the recipient
country, other major offset types--subcontracting and
counter-trade may not (Appendix B) . The latter two are
less likely to encourage the technological advancement of
the recipient. Therefore in this study, only the former
four types of offsets are discussed as channels of military
technology transfer.
A. OFFSETS
Offsets are commercial transactions in which the buyer
demands, as a condition of the sale, that the seller
compensate the buyer through a variety of nonmonetary
means. (Hammend, 1987, p. 175)
According to the U.S. Department of Defense, the first
military offset programs authorized the coproduction of the
F-104 aircraft and flAWK air defense system in Europe. Over
time, the demand for military offsets which began in the
developed countries (i.e., NATO, Japan, Australia, and
Switzerland) spread to the developing nations (i.e, Korea,
Israel, Taiwan, Sinaapore, India, Pakistan, Thailand,
Argentina, the Philippines, Brazil, and Turkey) . (Welk,
1984, p. 21)
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The existence of military offset programs stems from
the inelastic demand for military hardware among
governments, the need to purchase equipment abroad, and the
high prices of these goods (Welk, 1984, p. 21) . In order
to maintain and exercise their sovereignty, governments
feel the need to have a standing military force that is
prepared to defend the integrity of it's borders.
Most developing countries do not have economies large
enough to support the country' s arms industry needed to
satisfy the demand of defense. Therefore, offsets are used
for the targeted development of military industry and
enhancement of domestic capabilities by the purchasing
countries that are facing exchange earnings.
Brzoska and Ohlson (1985, p. 132) point out that
offsets may include:
1. The transfer of military technology
2. Subcontracting in the purchasing country for
components and spares for the weapon
3. The right to market the weapon on behalf of the
supplier
4. Repair and maintenance contracts for weapons, and
imports of other industrial goods from the recipient
by the supplying country.
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In offset arrangements, the offset is customary to
split into two groups--direct and indirect. Direct offsets
are those which are directly related to the product
purchased, such as its development, assembly or the
production of its components. On the other hand, indirect
offsets are contractual arrangements that involve goods and
services unrelated to the exports referenced in the sales
agreement (Neuman, 1985, p. 185)
.
The sale of F-16 C/D fighters to Turkey presents a
classic case study in the way offsets work and the
advantages that occur to each party. The Turkish F-16s
will be produced in part by a jointly-owned aircraft
manufacturing plant being built in Turkey by a Turkish
aerospace firm and by General Dynamics. It will coproduce
160 General Dynamics F-16 combat aircraft. The total value
of the project was $4.2 billion, $3 billion was provided by
EMS credits and the balance by the Turkish government.
The direct offset commitment, which included the
establishment of a joint venture manufacturing plant to
assemble the F-16 and produce its components. General
Dynamics and it's major sub-contractor, General Electric
were to aid the capitalization of the plant by the
1
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provision of 4 9% of the funds required, worth $70 million.
As a part of the agreement, General Dynamics has undertaken
to export any excess component production from the Turkish
plant. (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1984, p. 3, 7)
This is an example of a direct offset, similar to
arrangements made between U.S. and European firms in NATO
for a number of years. The aircraft or important
subsystems of it are manufactured jointly in the buyer'
s
country to help offset the cost of the buy by providing
employment, technology transfer, and investment in new
plants and equipment. Thus, Turkey will literally acquire
an aircraft industry.
The other aspect of the agreement is the indirect
offset commitment agreed to by General Dynamics--$1 . 27
billion. This had to be achieved within 10 years.
Otherwise the company would have to pay a 1.5% non-
fulfillment penalty. (Gavin, 1986, p. 169)
The indirect offset commitment was split into two
categories. Group 1, which included capital investment,
joint ventures and technology transfer, was to account for
10% of the total. Group 2, which includes the purchase for
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export of Turkish goods and services accounting for 90% of
the commitment
.
General Dynamics has become responsible for marketing
a complex list of Turkish products including tourism, power
projects, and marble. Wasting effort and resources on a
low cost venture will not significantly reduce the offset
commitments. Thus, General Dynamics is in the business of
economic development. It plans, designs, develops and
finances a product, industry, or real estate development
that provides Turkey with the cash to pay General Dynamics
for it's product. The multiplier effect on both the seller
and the buyer are of great potential and create a situation
in which the ideas, technology, and marketing skills of a
U.S. defense contractor are placed at the service of a
developing country that has little of these, and in many
cases, neither the success nor influence to obtain them
readily. The result may be a serendipitous arrangement of
mutual advantage.
For the purchasing country, offset arrangements bring
important benefits; they lessen the outflow of foreign
currency, maintain or create domestic employment, lead to
the acquisition of modern technology, create service
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capability for high technology equipment and assist in
local economic development. It is also clear that it
serves the interests of the supplier country by creating a
healthy interdependence on its weaponry, increasing it's
exports and promoting ties between the supplier and the
purchasing countries. (Church, 1984, p. 10)
B. LICENSED PRODUCTION
A license is commonly used to describe situations
where:
The owner of certain statuary rights in the technology..
.
grants permission to another party to exercise some of
those exclusive rights held by the owner of the
technology (Office of Industrial Innovation, 1986, p.
28) .
Licensing agreements generally include a series of
provisions regulating the rights and obligations of both
recipient and supplier with regard to use of the technology
(White, 1983, p. 30) . The oldest method of international
production of weapon systems that are developed in another
country is the bilateral licensing agreement. (Defense
Systems Management College, 1981, pp. 4-14)
Moreover, these agreements have become very common in
international transfer of military technology, both among
developed countries and between developed and developing
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countries. Highly competitive arms market has stimulated
these agreements. Because many arms receivers usually
prefer license purchases as a channel of military
technology transfer. (Brzoska and others, 1980, p. 15)
As indicated in Table 15, the United States is the
primary distributor of military technology. In the one-
and-one-half decade period of 1971-1985, the U.S.A.
provided weapon production licenses to seven different
developing nations. The types of major weapons licensed
included four licenses for helicopters, fast attack craft
and patrol craft respectively, and three licenses for
production of trainers and fighters respectively.
While United Kingdom, France, and West Germany actively
provide licenses to developing nations, they do not do so
at a level equalling the United States.
United Kingdom provided for ten different major weapon
systems to eight different developing recipients. France
issued licenses for seven different major weapon systems to
eight different developing countries. West Germany
provided licenses for ten weapon systems to eight different
developing countries. The Soviet Union supplied licenses
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for ten weapon systems to two different developing
countries
.
Among the fifteen suppliers of licenses to developing
countries, some of the suppliers themselves are often
categorized as developing nations. Brazil, Israel and
China are categorized as developing nations.
Quite instructive is the competition among suppliers.
While the U.S.A. is again the primary supplier of trainer
production licenses, it should be noted that eight
different nations provided such licenses. Five nations
provided licenses to produce fighters and patrol crafts.
Significant competition existed among armored personnel
carriers, fast attack craft, transport aircraft,
helicopters, frigates, submarines and anti-tank missiles.
Nine suppliers competed in sales of licenses among these
types of weapons.
Table 15 also indicates that there are basically three
types of military technology suppliers competing in the
developing countries.
1. The major suppliers include the United States of
America, Great Britain, France, and West Germany
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2. The Soviet Union followed by Italy, Switzerland and
Israel are significant suppliers of licenses
3. Austria, Spain, Brazil, China and Sweden are minor
suppliers of military technology.
The major suppliers each provided over seven different
weapons types licenses. The licenses issued by the middle
group varied from three to seven weapon types. The minor
licensers provided no more than two different weapon types
licenses
.
The number of licenses for various equipment
categories held by developing world nations is identified
in Table 16. The table reveals that among the twenty-one
developing countries, aircraft are the systems most
commonly produced under license. There are 15 agreements
to produce helicopters, 13 fighters and trainers
agreements, four transport aircraft agreements, three light
plane agreements, and two counter-insurgency aircraft
agreements
.
Sea equipment ranks second with licenses for 38 such
systems. There are licenses for 18 ground equipment
systems. Eight models of, missiles and one radar system are
produced under license among the developing nations.
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TABLE 15. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' LICENSE ACTIVITY OF MAJOR














per I f capon
AIR
1 miners 1 2 1 3 1 1 1 3 13 8
1 ichters 2 3 5 3 13 5
Helicopters 8 3 4 15 3
Licht Planes 2 I 3 2
Counter- Insurgency
Aircrall 1 1 2
2
haiiFpoit Aircraft 1 1 1 1 3 4
GROUND
Annnred Personnel
Carriers 1 1 2 1 5
4
Main Battle lank 3 1 4 2
Mediunt lank 1 1 1
Arnioied Cars 2 2 1





Howitzers 1 1 1
SEA
Fast Attack Crafl 2 2 4 I 9 4
Frieates 1 1 4 (i 3
Petrol Crafl' • 3 4 5 12 5
Submarines 1 2 1 4 3
Destrovers 1 1 1
l.andins Craft 1 1 2 4 3
l.andinp Ships 2 2 2
MI SSI LI" & RADAR
SYSIUMS
Ami- 1 auk Missiles 2 2 1 5 3
Air-to-Air Missile 1 1 1
Ship-to-Ship Missile 2 2 I




2 1 1 19 17 3 6 2 5 1 25 II 20
NUMER or WEAP-
ONS PER COUNTRY 2 1 1 7 10 2 4 2 4 1 10 5 10
1
Source: Prepared from M. firznska and 1. Ohison, Anns Transfers to the Third lloiH 1971-85,
SIPRI, Oxioid University Press, 1987, pp. 282-286.
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The United States' licenses have been granted mainly
for aircraft and sea weapon systems, the French military
industry has been mainly involved in helicopters and guided
missiles. British and West Germans have been particularly
active in shipyards.
Table 16 also indicates the relative number of weapon
types licenses used by twenty-one developing countries who
produce major systems under such agreements. As indicated,
India has the most diverse licensed production plans.
Eleven different systems are planned for production under
21 license agreements in India. Seven fighter types, two
kinds of helicopters and transport aircraft were or are
planned for production in India under such agreements.
India has obtained licenses for two different main battle
tanks, and anti-tank missiles, an armored personnel
carrier, an infantry combat vehicle, a frigate, a
submarine, an air-to-air missile and a radar system.
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TABLE 16. NUMBER OF MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS LICENSES IN
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Among the recipients in the developing countries, clear
patterns appear. Many recipients use multiple suppliers
for licenses. For example, India utilized five different
industrial license suppliers to produce weapons systems in
eleven different categories. Other major multiple source
users include Brazil, Indonesia, Pakistan, Argentina,
Chile, Singapore, and South Africa. While Taiwan and South
Korea are highly involved in license production, they rely
on limited sources. North Korea, Peru, Algeria, and
Malaysia use only two sources for licenses. Single source
recipients in the developing countries include Nigeria,
Mexico and Madagascar.
In the last one-and-one-half decades, licensed
production has expanded in Turkish military industry's role
in the manufacture of the G-3, MG-3 infantry weapons, 1
ammunition, missiles and artillery. \
All of the above data signal the growing phenomenon of
transfer military technology to the developing countries
through the instrument of license.
C . COPRODUCTION
The U.S. Department of Defense (1974, p. 2) defines
coproduction as:
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...any program wherein the U.S. Government ... enables an
e] iaible foreian government, international organization,
or designated commercial producer to acquire the know-
how to manufacture or assemble, repair, maintain and
operate, in whole or in part, a specific weapon,
communication or support system, or an individual
military item.
The more sophisticated the weapon system is, the higher
usually the share of foreign parts and know how.
Multilateral and bilateral coproduction forms are arranged
either vertically or horizontally. (Tuami and Vayrynen,
1982, p. 139)
Vertical coproduction means that the industry of the
purchasing country not only produces components for the
particular weapon system bought by the country, but also
produces those components for all the systems which are
constructed abroad. These components can be totally or
partially indigenous.
Horizontal coproduction, in turn, contains only the
production of components for those weapons acquired by the
country herself. It is almost self-evident that vertical
coproduction is more profitable to the producer of the
components than horizontal because in the vertical
arrangement, the factors reducing unit costs are more
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visible. Also from the standpoint of the seller, the
vertical version would be more useful because the cost
reduction is also beneficial to him. The economic factor
may be the main explanation of the fact that vertical
coproduction projects have been recently on the increase.
The extent of U.S. coproduction projects abroad can be
obtained from Table 17 which gives the number of projects
by leading arms manufacturers as well as their distribution
between developed and developing countries.
A number of conclusions can easily be drawn from Table
17. First, practically all the corporations on the list
are aircraft manufacturers which seem to be most
internationalized both in terms of exports, direct
investments and coproduction patterns. There are more
joint projects with governments and manufacturers from
developed rather than developing countries. Japan and
Italy are very central partners; U.S. aircraft
manufacturers have concluded altogether 40 joint projects
with them.
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General Electric 12 _ 12
Bell 8 2 10
Northrop 3 2 5
Sikorsky 5 — 5
Cessna — 4 4
Hughes 3 1 4
Pratt & Whitney 4 — 4
Boeing 4 — 4
Lycoming 3 1 4
Ratheon 3 — 3
General Dynamics 2 — 2
Lockheed 2 — 2
Pazmany — 2 2
McDonnell Douglas 2 — 2
All Others 7 8 15
TOTAL 58 20 78
Source: Helena Tuami and Raimo Vayrynen, Transnational
Corporations^ Armaments and Development, St. Martin's
Press, 1982, p. 136.
D. JOINT VENTURE
Joint venture can be defined as a development and
manufacturing of military systems involving more than one
military-industrial firm and significant level of interfirm
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cooperation in research, design, production and marketing,
as well as significant contributions by all partners to
develop funds and risk capital. (Mowary, 1987, p. 3)
Recently, an increasing number of new investments have
been joint ventures involving ownership between local and
foreign partners. There are various factors contributing
to the growth of joint ventures as a transfer channel of
military technology. Developing countries may pass
legislation either prohibiting total foreign ownership or
making incentives conditional upon certain degrees of local
ownership. On the other hand, technology suppliers have
become increasingly aware of the benefits of sharing
ownership with local partners. These include land,
capital, trained personnel and familiarity with local
markets. (Kaynak, 1985, p. 163)
The two types of joint ventures are equity and
contractual (White, 1983, pp. 18-24)
.
Legislation of the recipient countries encourage the
formation of equity joint ventures on the basis of
requirements related to the share of equity in local hands
and its effects on the decision making system of the
enterprise.
80
In general, the participation share of local party in
joint venture is at least 51 percent. In the Turkish joint
venture example, the Turkish Aerospace Industry, Inc
(TUSAS) holds 51 percent of capitalization as a
participation share. The foreign partner, General
Dynamics, with its major subcontractor. General Electric,
are to aid the capitalization of the plant by the provision
of 4 9 percent of the funds required.
Equity joint ventures normally imply the combined
transfer of other resources of the foreign enterprise, such
as capital and management, so that they cannot be
considered as a specific mechanism exclusively for
technology transfer.
However, equity joint ventures have an important
incidence on the way and conditions in which technology can
be transferred from abroad. The main implications concern
(White, 1983, p. 19) :
1. The strategies of technology suppliers--i . e
.
transnational corporations and other firms vis a vis
the supply of technology through this mechanism,
2. The procedures of technology transfer and
renumeration,
3. The capacity of the military-industrial firm to ensure
an effective transfer.
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The other kind of joint venture is contractual.
Transfer of technology could be the central, basic
objective of these contracts, or just an aspect of a more
complex arrangement. But the essential characteristic of
contractual joint ventures is that there is a complete de-
linking of the resource transfer and the equity ownership
of the foreign supplier of technology; and that the foreign
suppliers are granted rights for only a specified period of
time. In this sense, they appear in principle to be a more
unpackaged way of technology transfer than the equity based
arrangements. (White, 1983, p. 23)
The experiences of the Arab Organization of
Industrialization (AOI)" exemplify the joint venture arms
projects to transfer military technology in developing
countries
.
The agreements negotiated with Western governments and
arms industries followed a basic pattern: the AOI created
a subsidiary company which represented a partnership with
the supplier. The chairman of the subsidiary was an Arab,
while the managing director came from the foreign partner.
^^For more information on AOI see: Vayrynen (1979, pp. 66-
79) . The AOI also sometimes referred to as the AMIO-The Arab
Military Industries Organization.
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The supplier agreed to deliver technical assistance and
training, as well as some initial equipment over the period
of the agreement. In each case, the AOI had the majority
interest in the subsidiary company (Vayrynen and Ohlson,
1986, pp. 110-112) . Table 18 lists the characteristics of
the initial AOI joint ventures with Western companies.^*
E. FOREIGN DESIGN ASSISTANCE
Foreign design assistance has become an important type
of technology transfer. Some cases of design assistance
are listed in Table 19.
The supplier country transfers information that may be
classified and thus difficult to obtain for designing an
indigenous weapon system.
These alternative channels of military technology
transfer are not clearly differentiated and thus often
overlap. In this sense, there are two main points to be
considered in the selection of the channel. (White, 1983,
p. 36) First, generally, the terms and conditions
^"The future of these projects looked dim, when, in 1979, Saudi
Arabia and the other Gulf AOI members decided to stop funding AOI
activities and leave the AOI. The main reason, it was argued, was
that the Camp David Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt directly
contradicted the purpose of the AOI
.
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TABLE 18. INITIAL AOI JOINT VENTURES





1978 ' AOI 51% CJ-6 jeeps
American Motor Co.
49%
Some to be equipped with
Swingfire anti-tank missile-;;











Contract value S80 million Continued
Arab-British 1978
Helicopter
« = (Co. (ABII)
AOI 7or«
Westland 30%
Lynx helicopters Planned procurement of 280;











Gem engines 750 turbo-shaH engines to
power the Lynx helicopters;














Planned procurement of 160;
to be followed by asscmblv
of Mirage 2000
Cancelled, but cotitinue











To be followed by the
SNECMA M53 powering the
Mirage 2000
Cancelled, but continue







Military electronics Only major AOI plant outside
Egypt; situated at Al Kharj in




*rhese percentages represent the current shares. At the time of AOI's dissolution in 1979, the shares were not fixed.
Planned shareholding of Dassault-Breguet and SNECMA was reportedly to have been 25 percent.
Source: R. Wayrjnen and T. Ohhon, "Eg>pt: Arms Production in the Transnational Context," in M. Brzoska and T. Ohison,
eds., Arms Production in the Third World, SIPRI, Taylor & Francis, 1986, p. 112.
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TABLE 19 SELECTED CASES FOR FOREIGN DESIGN ASSISTANCE




Argentina IA-27 Palqui Fighter 1946 Dewoitine,
France
Argentina IA-33 Palqui-2 Fighter 1950 Kurt Tank, FRG
Egypt HA-200 Trainer 1960 FRG, Spain
South Africa Whiplash Air-to-Air
Missile
1964 FRG
Argentina TAM Medium Tank 1974 Thyssen, FRG
Taiwan AT-3 Trainer 1975 Northrop, USA
Argentina IA-63 Pampa Trainer 1977 Dornier, FRG
Brazil V-28 Type Frigate 1978 Marine Tecliaik,
FRG




Thailand Thaiang Type MCM 1978 Perrostaal, FRG
India Vicram Class Corvette 1979 The Netherlands




( ) uncertain data
Source: M. Brzoska and T. Ohlson, "Arms Production in the TJiird
World: An Overview," in M. Brzoska and T. Ohlson, eds . , Arms
Production in the Third Pforld, SIPRI, Taylor & Francis, 1986a, p.
27.
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negotiated within each form are more important than the
forms as such. Second, the correct choice of the channel
depends on the type and size of the weapon project,
internal capacity of the recipient military-industrial
firm, and a constellation of external factors, ranging from
legislation to external finance.
From the efficiency point of view, generally, it is
assumed that joint ventures are better than other transfer
channels. The first reason is that the technology
supplier, who shares the risks and profits of the project,
will be directly interested in the success of the
enterprise. The second reason is that there is a
continuous association in responsibility and division of
labor between the partners. (White, 1983, p. 21)
Through the network of licenses, coproduction, joint
ventures and foreign design assistance agreements, today's
military technology receiver becomes a producer.
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V. THE RESULTS OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
The transfer of military technology to developing
countries affects the military and civilian sectors.
Moreover, the transfer has benefits and drawbacks to both
supplier and receiver countries.
A. EFFECTS ON THE CIVILIAN SECTORS OF THE SOCIETY
Neuman and Harkavy (1979, pp. 234-237) developed a
hypothetical model that shows how military technology
transfer connects with the rest of society in developing
countries (Figure 4).
The transfer process begins when the policy makers of
a developing country decide on the basis of their available
resources, and security and development goals, to obtain
military technology abroad. After negotiations with the
supplier country are complete and the requirements of the
buyer country established, the formal transfer of military
technology begins. Even >^efore receiving +"h'=^ military
technology, the military derives benefits from this
transfer such as increased technical, management, and
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language training; perhaps higher morale; travel abroad;




























































OUTPL T) DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPMENT
Note: The direction of any particular arrow and the
value of its net flow (positive or negative) may change
from time period to time period.
Source: S. G. Neuman and R. E. Harkavy, "Transfers and
Economic Development," in S. G. Neuman and R. E.
Harkavy, Arms Transfers in the Modern World, Praeger
Publishers, 1979, p. 235.
Figure 4. Effects of Military Technology Transfer on
Civilian Sectors of the Society
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However, as the military technology begins to arrive,
the picture becomes more complicated. Negative spinoffs
affect some parts of society, although this can vary with
the amount and kind of military technology received. For
example, increased military demand may create a drain on
already scarce human and natural resources, disrupt
civilian, and overload insufficient communications networks
and infrastructure facilities. On the other hand, some
civilian sectors may derive many unanticipated benefits
from these military activities. The housing,
communications, transportation, educational, and health
sectors are often the first to be mobilized to meet
military requests associated with imported military
technology.
Bases must be built to store, operate and maintain new
weapons. Housing, roads, railroads, parts, telephones,
electricity, water supplies, schools, and hospitals must be
established to serve them. In turn, these bases often
located in remote regions of the country, stimulate the
growth of satellite cities which leads to further change.
The industrial sector also becomes involved. A longer,
better educated military creates a larger, more
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sophisticated domestic market. In addition, more food,
uniforms, medicines, supplies, and technical equipment
(ranging from batteries to buses) must be purchased by the
military from the civilian economy. In this way, not only
profits, but large amounts of technical and management
know-how, are transferred into the civilian sector. Thus,
local manufacturers gear up their production lines for a
bigger market and are encouraged to produce a better
product
.
As the capabilities of the country increase, feedback
from the civilian sector influences arms-procurement
policies. Security and development goals change as the
country grows; competing pressure groups vie for foreign-
exchange resources; domestic industries and educational
institutions provide more of the needed resources so that
foreign military equipment and training become less
necessary, and the circle is complete. (Neuman and Harkavy,
1979, p. 236)
B. EFFECTS ON THE MILITARY
It is becoming increasingly evident that military
technology is a powerful factor in shaping the military
doctrines. Military technologies and doctrines mutually
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reinforce each other within a political environment. (Tuami
and Vayrynen, 1982, p. 254)
When developing countries transfer military technology
at the same time, they also acquire specific modes of
organization and military doctrines from the developed
countries
.
This is not necessarily bad; however, it cannot help
but confuse military planning and raise questions
about operational effectiveness. Possession of a new
technology is not equivalent to the possession of a
new military capability. This technology must be
incorporated into the existing military structure. If
it cannot, then the structure must be changed (which
could entail considerable disruption) or the
technology should be abandoned. (Moodie, 1979, pp. 41-
42)
As a result of military technology transfer, mainly the
structure of the armed forces of a country ought to change
toward professionalized organization in order to use the
technological development efficiently.
C. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER
Military technology transfer has both benefits and





Through the technology transfer process, the
recipient country acquires the necessary military
technology which has been proven technically, without an
unacceptably high degree of risk, on a fast timetable.
Moreover, the recipient country can supplement its own
development programs, and acquire spare parts and
components easily. However, there are possible
disadvantages in becoming a recipient of military
technology: (Office of Industrial Innovation, 1986, p. 8)
1. The recipient could become locked into a particular
technology,
2. The recipient may assume the obligation to purchase
tied-in products, such as spare parts and associated
elements while utilizing technology,
3. The recipient can be forced to accept restrictions in
its marketing and policies relating to the licensed
military technology, such as restrictions on export.
2 . Supplier Country
There are several benefits to suppliers of military
technology (Parker, 1974, p. 31). These include:
1. Maintaining reasonable, friendly relations with
recipient nations,
2. Retaining a share of the market in recipient
countries,
3. Decreasing the balance-of-payment deficits,
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4. Establishing the recipient country as a market for
both the supplier's spare parts and maintenance
services for the transferred technology and, finally,
5. Permitting the supplier to acquire a part-interest in
the recipient company in return for supplying the
technology, such as in a joint venture.
On the other hand, the recipient country could become
a competitor and threaten the lead of the supplier'
s
technology. Therefore, the supplier may choose not to
supply its military technology. Moreover, the supplier
country also has to worry that technology supplied to
unstable regimes may someday fall into the hands of hostile
forces. Finally, the growing arms production in the
developing countries will reduce the supplier's control




VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The ultimate objective of Turkish defense policy is to
achieve self-sufficiency in arms production to assert
national independence. However, there are two major
reasons why achieving total self-sufficiency in arms
production in Turkey is very difficult. First, military
technology develops so fast that the limited resources do
not allow outlays on research and development to keep up
with it . Second, producing everything related to all
military systems often is not possible or not feasible
within the resource constraints.
Success in developing and producing defense systems
relies heavily on the industrial capability, human capital
and technological base. As Table 4 shows, Turkey has more
defense production capacity than she has been using.
Therefore, there are some slack resources which have not
been used in the arms production process such as the
private sector ability. On the other hand, Turkey has
enough technological base only to assemble some of the
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weapon systems and production of basic components designed
abroad.
In order to produce major weapon systems to satisfy the
needs of the Turkish Armed Forces and export purposes,
Turkey has to transfe^r military technology from abroad.
The following projects have been selected to fulfill
the needs of the Turkish Armed Forces to create an adequate
technological base in the arms production and for export
military hardware:
1. F-16 C/D combat aircraft
2. Light cross-country vehicles
3. Low altitude air defense system
4. Stringer and Maverick missile
5. Multiple-launch rocket systems
6. Armored combat vehicles
7. Transportation aircraft and helicopters
If the prescribed path strategy of military technology
transfer for total self-sufficiency in arms production is
followed, it is very likely that the efforts moving from
licensed to indigenous production will fail. There is no
developing country which has achieved the total self-
sufficiency in arms production. For example, Argentina in
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the 1950s and Egypt in the 1960s failed in moving from
licensed production to indigenous arms production. Israel,
India and Brazil have been more successful, but they are
dependent on foreign military technology in terms of
blueprints and components.
Turkey first has to create an efficient military
technological base and reduce the technological gap by
utilizing licensing, coproduction, joint venture and
foreign design assistance as channels of technology
transfer. Depending on terms and conditions negotiated
within each channel, joint ventures may be better than
other transfer forms, because technology suppliers share
the risks of the weapons production.
Policy makers in Turkey have agreed that joint venture
with economic offsets would allow for an expansion of the
domestic arms production. Also this will facilitate the
transfer of military technology to Turkey and enhance
Turkey's status in the international arms market.
The key requirement of joint venture, coproduction and
licensing agreements should be a provision that permits
export sales of the military product to third parties. In
addition, arms production agreements should require that
i
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the foreign investor be the minority shareholder in any
joint venture with a Turkish firm. For instance, one-third
participation by government capital, one-third by the
foreign firm, and one-third by Turkish private enterprise
may be put into implementation as a policy.
Turkey has limited research and development capacity
and relatively dependent industrial sector. Therefore,
instead of having a desire to become self-sufficient in a
broad range of equipment, Turkey should be specializing in
military products in which she can develop a competitive
advantage.
After acquiring a certain level of military technology
and experience in production of weapon systems, Turkey then
should apply engineering strategies in the indigenous arms
production. Because, developing new technology is very
costly. Furthermore, technologically sophisticated
products rapidly become obsolete, forcing the producers to
modify and improve on a continuous basis.
One of the engineering strategies that Turkey may
follow is "add-on engineering". Application of this
strategy will start with existing weapon technology which
is first transferred and then produced under license or
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other means. The designs may then be studied, modified,
and adopted to the requirements of the Turkish Armed
Forces. In this strategy, efforts are put at updating and
improving the existing military technology rather than
investing scarce resources into the development of new
designs
.
The second strategy that Turkey may follow is "add-up
engineering". The Turkish defense industry may put
together components available from any outside sources to
a system not available elsewhere. Therefore, the basic
source of technology is not one specific system. This
strategy requires the availability of the major components
and more technical capability than add-on engineering.
Turkey would not sustain a domestic defense industry
without arms exports. However, exports of weapons can only
be achieved in the international market if the domestic
arms production is efficient, if its product is of good
quality, is simple, and it's prices are competitive.
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APPENDIX A
MILITARY CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES LIST




2.1 System Architecture Technology
2.1.1 General System Architecture Technology
2.1.2 Processor Architecture Technology
2.1.3 Memory Hierarchy Technology
2.2 Systems Hardware Development and Production
Technology
2.2.1 Computer Hardware Development Technology
2.2.3 Computer Manufacturing Control System (CMOS) and
Computer Assisted Manufacturing (CAM) Technology
2.2.4 Interconnections Technology
2.2.5 Production Test Technology
2.2.6 Computer Cooling Technology
2.2.7 Power Supply and Distribution
2.3 Digital Computer System Utilization Technology
2.3.1 Computer-Assisted Servicing (CAS) Technology
2.3.2 Computer System Configuration Management
Technology
2.3.3 Digital Computer Security Technology
2.3.4 Computer-Assisted Training/Simulation Technology
2.4 Logic and High-Speed Memory Assembly Technology
2.4.1 Semiconductor Logic and Memory Assembly
Technology
2.4.2 Magnetic Core Memory Technology
2.4.3 Josephson Junction Technology
2.4.4 Charge-Coupled Device (CCD) Memory Technology
2.4.5 Magnetic Bubble Logic and Memory Technology
2.4.6 Magnetic Cross-Tie Memory Technology




2.5.1 Magnetic Disc Storage
2.5.1.1 Magnetic Disc Read/Write Head Technology
2.5.1.2 Magnetic Disc Recording Media Technology
2.5.1.3 Winchester Disc Technology
2.5.1.4 Flexible Disc Drive Technology
2.5.2 Magnetic Tape Storage Technology
2.5.2.1 Conventional Magnetic Tape Drive Technology
2.5.2.2 Cartridge/Cassette Technology
2.5.3 Other Storage Technology
2.5.3.1 Electron Beam Memory
2.5.3.2 Optical Cryogenic Memory Technology
2.5.3.3 Holographic/Laser Memory Technology
2.5.3.4 Video Disc Digital Recording Technology
2.5.3.5 Archival Magnetic Tape Memory Technology
2.6 Digital Computer Display and Peripheral
Technology
2.6.1 Alphanumeric and Graphic Terminal Technology
2.6.2 Peripheral Technology
2.6.2.1 Digital Flat-Bed Technology
2.6.2.2 Nonimpact Line Printer Technology
2.7 Analog and Hybrid Computer
2.8 Other Related Technology
2.8.1 Speech Processing Technology
2.8.2 Artificial Intelligence Technology
3.0 SOFTWARE TECHNOLOGY
3.1 Development Environment Technology
3.1.1 Software Life-Cycle Management Technology
3.1.2 Software Library Data Base
3.1.3 Software Development Tool Technology
3.1.4 Formal Methods and Tools for Developing Trusted
Software Technology
3.2 Operations and Maintenance
3.2.1 Maintenance of Large Software Product Technology
3.3 Application Software Technology
3.3.1 Secure Software Technology
3.3.2 Large Self-AdaD^-ina Software System T^echnology
4 . AUTOMATED REAL-TIME CONTROL TECHNOLOGY
4.1 Utilization of Digital Processing Technology
4.2 Analog and Hybrid Computing Technique Technology
4.3 Display Technology
4.4 Related Software Technology
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5.0 MATERIALS TECHNOLOGY
5.1 Metals and Alloys Technology
5.1.1 Magnetic and Amorphous Metals Technology
5.1.2 Nickel-Based Alloys Technology
5.1.3 Titanium Alloys Technology
5.1.4 High-Temperature Coatings Technology for
Superalloys and Titanium
5.1.5 Niobium (Columbium) Alloys Technology
5.1.6 Molybdenum Alloys Technology
5.1.7 Tungsten Alloys Technology
5.1.8 Casting and Coating Technology of Intricate
Hollow Superalloy Shapes
5.1.9 Plasma Spraying Technology
5.1.10 Advanced Powder Metallurgy Technology
5.1.11 Superplastic Forming/Diffusion Bonding (SPF/DB)
Technology
5.1.12 Titanium, Nickel, and Iron Aluminides Technology
5.1.13 Superconducting Materials Technology
5.1.14 Pressure Pipe Fittings Technology
5.2 Advanced Composites Technology
5.2.1 Fibers and Filamentary Materials
5.2.2 Filament Winding, Tape Laying, and Interlacing
Technology
5.2.3 Advanced Organic Matrix
5.2.4 Metal- and Graphic-Matrix Composites Technology
5.2.5 Ceramics Technology
5.2.8 Superalloy Composites Technology
5.3 Processing and Forming Technologies
5.3.1 Hot Isostatic Pressing (HIP) Technology
5.3.2 High-Temperature Press Technology
5.3.3 Isothermal Rolling Mill Technology
5.3.4 Isothermal Metal Working Technology
5.3.5 High-Temperature Furnace and Coating Unit
Technology
5.3.6 Numerically Controlled Machine Tools Technology
5.3.7 Precision Turning Machines Technology
5.3.8 Spin- and Flow-Forming Machines Technology
5.3.9 High Vacuum Technology (Pumps)
5.3.10 Laser Processing Technology
5.3.11 High Performance Welding Technology
5.3.12 Fracture Analysis, Nondestructive Evaluation
(NDE) , and Control Technology
5.3.13 Test Equipment for Integrated Structural Testing
Technology
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6.0 DIRECTED ENERGY TECHNOLOGY
6.1 High Energy Laser (HEL Lasers) Technology
6.1.1 High Energy Laser Technology
6.1.2 Mirror and Optical Device Technology
6.1.3 Beam Pointing and Control Technology
6.1.4 Mounting Subsystem Technology
6.1.5 Beam-Targeting Coupling Technology
6.1.6 Beam Propagation Technology
6.2 Particle Beam Technology
6.2.1 High-Current Particle Beam Generation Technology
6.2.1.1 Post-Injection (Particle Beam Accelerator)
Technology
6.2.2 Short-Term Energy Generation Subsystem Technology
6.2.3 Beam Propagation Technology
6.2.4 Beam-Target Coupling Technology
6.2.5 Beam Control Subsystem Technology
6.2.6 Beam Neutralization Technology
6.3 Microwave Energy Transmission Technology






7 . 1 . 5A Lithography-Resist Processing
7 . 1 . 5B Lithography-Wafer Imaging
7.1.6 Selective Removal
7.1.7 Diffusion/Implementation

















7.4 Acoustic Wave Device Technology
7.5 Thin Film Memory Device Technology
7.5.1 Magnetic Bubble Memories
7.5.2 Plated Wire Memories
7.5.3 Cross-Tie Memories
7.6 Passive Component Technology
7.6.1 Ferrite Materials
7.6.2 Boundary Layer Monolithic Ceramic Capacitors
7.6.3 Quartz Crystals
7.6.4 Printed Circuit Boards
7.7 Cryogenic Component Technology
7.7.1 Superconducting Digital Components
7.7.2 Superconducting RF Components
7.7.3 Cryogenic Coolers
7.8 Electronic Material Technology
7.8.1 Bulk Indium Phosphide (InP)
7.8.2 Bulk Gallium Arsenide (GaAs)
7.8.3 Vapor Phase Epitaxy of In^^Ga^Pi .^As^on InP
7.8.4 Lead Lanthamum Zirconium Titanate (PZLT)
7.8.5 Lead Zirconium Titanate (Pb (Zr, Ti) O^, PZT)
7.8.6 MgO (Magnesium Oxide, Periclase)
7.8.7 Thin Film Interference Coatings for Optics and
Other Applications by Vacuum Deposition
7.8.8 Sodium and Potassium Halides (NaF, NaCl, KCl, KBr
etc)
7.8.9 Thallium Bromoidiode (TIBr^i:,, KRS-5)
7.8.10 Dehydrogen Phosphates (ADP, KDP, KD P, CD P, CD
A, etc)
7.8.11 Bismuth Silicon Oxide (BSP, Bii.SiO.o) Bismuth
Germanium Oxide (BGO, Bii2Ge02o)
7.8.12 Polyvalent Binary Fluorides (e.g., BaF, CeFj LaF^
ThF, ZrFj
7.8.13 Yttrofluorides (e.g., LiYF^, KY,,F.o, etc)
7.8.14 Niobates and Tantalates (e.g., LiNbOj, LiTaOj
KNbOj)
7.8.15 Neodymium Laser Hosts (especially YAG (Y,Al ,,)
^
but also including La2be2U3, Ndp30i4 K^NdLi.^F^o, etc)
7.8.16 Lanthanum Chloride Laser Materials (LaClj: Pr'*,
Er'' etc)
7.8.17 Mercury Cadmium Telluride (bulk and thin films)
7.8.18 Cadmium Telluride Crystals
7.8.19 Lead Telluride (PbTe)
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7.8.20 Ipitaxial Lead Tin Telluride and Lead Telluride
(PbSnTe and PbTe)
7.8.21 Lead Tin Selenide (Pbi,SN,Se)
7.8.22 Electroptical Materials with the Chalcopywrite
Structure
7.8.23 Rate Earth-Transition Metal Permanent Magnets
(example: samarium cobalt and substituted
samarium cobalt)
7.8.24 Galdolinium Gallium Garnet (GGG) and Substituted
GGG as a Substrate for Magnetic Oxide Films (see
also Section 7.5)
7.8.25 Materials for Magnetic Bubble Memories (Thin
Magnetic Films Grown on Subsrates)
7.8.26 Germanium-High Purity Detector Grade
7.8.27 3" or Greater Diameter Silicon Wafers
7.8.28 Detector Grade Silicon Wafer with Resistivity
10,000-15,000 ohmcm
7.8.29 Indium Doped Extrinsic Silicon Crystals with
Indium Concentration of about 10"cm'^
7.8.30 Silicon on Sapphire (SOS)





8.1 Time-Domain Measurement Technology
8.1.1 Oscilloscope Technology
8.1.2 Time Interval Measurement Technology
8.2.1 Radio Spectrum Analyzer Technology
8.2.2 Panoramic and Digital Receiver Technology
8.2.3 Real-Time Spectrum Analyzer Technology
8.2.4 Frequency-Counter Technology
8.3 Frequency Standards and Signal Source Technology
8.3.1 Frequency Standard Technology
8.3.2 Frequency Synthesizer Technology
8.3.3 Signal Generator Technology
8.4 Electrical Parameter and Digital Measuring
Technology
8.4.1 Network Analyzer Technology
8.4.2 Digital Volume Measuring Technology
8.4.3 Microwave Power Meter Technology
8.5 Digital Instrument Technology
8.5.1 Logic Analyzer Technology
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8.5.2 Microprocessor Development System Technology
8.5.3 Analog-to-Diqital and Digital-to-Analog
Converter Technology
8.5.4 Automatic Test Equipment Technology




8.7 Photographic and Optical Measurement Technology
8.7.1 Photographic Interpretation Technology
8.7.2 Laser Rangefinding Technology
8.7.3 Laser Measurement Technology
8.7.4 LIDAR/Laser Radar Technology
8.7.5 Aerial and Streak Camera Technology
8.7.6 High Speed Cinema Recording Technology
8.7.7 Microdensitometer Technology
9.0 TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY
9.1 Telecommunications Systems Technology
9.1.1 RF Communications Systems Technology
9.1.2 Optical Communications Technology
9.1.3 Acoustic Communications Systems Technology
9.1.4 Space Qualified Telecommunications Equipment
Technology
9.2 Switching Technology
9.2.1 Circuit Switching Technology
9.2.2 Message Switching Technology
9.2.3 Packet Switching Technology
9.3 Modems and Multiplexing Technology
9.3.1 Modem technology
9.3.2 Multiplexing Technology
10.0 COMMUNICATION, NAVIGATION, GUIDANCE, AND
CONTROL TECHNOLOGY
10.1 Vehicle Control Technology
10.1.1 Spacecraft Guidance and Control Technology
10.1.1.1 Spacecraft Stabilization Technology
10.1.1.2 Spacecraft Attitude Control
10.1.1.3 Spacecraft Techniques for Space Environmental
Effects
10.1.1.4 Satellite Thermal Design Technology










Air Vehicle Guidance and Control Technology
Remote Control Techniques
Ship Guidance and Control Technology
Navigation and Positioning Techniques
Techniques for In-Water Speed Measurement and
Integration
Submersible Guidance and Control Technology
Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) and Related
Technology
10.2.1 Inertial Navigation Systems Integration
Technology
10.2.2 Inertial Gimballed Platform Technology
10.2.3 Inertial Strapdown Systems Technology
10.2.4 Floated Bail-Bearing Gyroscope Technology
10.2.5 Gas Bearing Gyroscope Technology
10.2.6 Flexure Rotor Gyroscope Technology
10.2.7 Ring Laser Gyroscope Technology
10.2.8 Electrostatically Supported Gyroscope Technology
10.2.9 Nuclear Magnetic Resonance Gyroscope Technology
10.2.10 Fiber Optics Gyroscope Technology
10.2.11 Low-Cost Gyroscope Technology
10.2.12 Accelerometer Technology
10.2.13 Autopilot Technology
10.2.14 Test, Calibration and Alignment Technology
10.3 Cooperative Systems for Radio Navigation and
Radio Communication Technology
10.3.1 Techniques for Platform Cooperative Radio-
Navigation and Radio Direction Finding
10.3.1.1 Radio Signal Conversion Technology
10.3.1.2 Radio Signal Detection and Processing Technology
10.3.1.3 Navigation Computation and Control Technology
10.3.1.4 Systems Integration Technology
10.3.2 Platform Cooperative Radio Communication
Technology
10.3.2.1 Radio Signal-to-Noise Enhancement Technology
10.3.2.2 Antenna Matching Over a Multiplicity of User
Allocated RF Band Technology
10.3.2.3 Radio Signal Transmitting, Receiving Detection,
and Processing Tfeclinoloyy
10.3.3 General Avionics/Electronics Systems Technology
10.3.3.1 Utilization of Solid-State Digital Components in
System Design Technology
10.3.3.2 System Architecture Technology
10.3.3.3 Ruggedized/Hardened Equipment Technology
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10.3.4 Display and Control Interface for Integrated
Communication /Naviqat ion Technoloqy
10.3.4.1 Improved HUD--Holographic Combiner Lens
Technology
10.3.4.2 Voice Control Input Technology
11.0 MICROWAVE TECHNOLOGY
11.1 Microwave Tube Technology
11.1.1 Electron Gun and Beam Design
11.1.2 Microwave Circuits
11.1.3 Microwave Tube Assembly
11.2 Microwave Solid-State Device Technology
11.3 High Power Microwave Control Component Technology
11.4 Waveguide and Component Technology
12.0 VEHICULAR TECHNOLOGY
12.1 Aeronautical Vehicle Technology
12.1.1 Laminar Flow Control (LFC)
12.1.2 Airfoil, Helicopter Rotor and Wing Designs
(including high lift devices)
12.1.3 Computer-Aided Design and Manufacture (CAD/CAM)
12.1.4 Technologies for Integrating Sensor Subsystems
12.1.5 Control and Configured Vehicles
12.1.6 Flight Control and Flight Management
12.1.7 Electromagnetic Hardening Technology
12.1.8 High Contact Ratio, Double-Helical (Herribone)
Gears
12.1.9 High Survivability (Loss of Lubrication)
Technology
12.1.10 Advanced Propellers
12.1.11 Advanced Structural Bonding
12.2 Marine Vehicle Technology
12.2.1 Hydrodynamic Design of Advanced Hull Forms
12.2.2 Foil and Foil Structure Design for Advanced
Hydrofoils
12.2.3 Lightweight M=ir"!np Platform Structnr<=^ Technology
12.2.4 Technology tor £ le.iible Curtains and Skirts for
Air Bubble Supported Platforms
12.2.5 Automated Platform Controls for Hydrofoils and
Other High-Speed Marine Vehicles
12.2.6 Polymer Injection Technology for Drag Reduction
12.3 Deep Submergence Vehicle Technology
12.3.1 Manned Submersibles, Untethered
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12.3.2 Manned Submersibles, Tethered and Diving
Equipment
12.3.3 Unmanned, Tethered and Towed Submersibles
12.3.4 Unmanned, Untethered Vehicles
12.3.5 Syntactic Foam Technology
12.4 Gas Turbine Propulsion for Aeronautical Vehicle
Technology
12.4.1 System Configuration, Aerodynamic and
Thermodynamic Analysis
12.4.2 Variable Flowpath Technology
12.4.3 Centrifugal Flow Compressor Aerodynamics
12.4.4 Axial Flow Fan and Compressor Aerodynamics
12.4.5 Turbine Technology
12.4.6 Cooler Turbine Technology
12.4.7 Rotating Propulsion System Structures
12.4.8 High DN Rolling Element Bearings
12.4.9 Gas Film Bearing Design
12.4.10 Ceramic Hybrid Bearing Design
12.4.11 Gaspath Sealing Technology
12.4.12 Gaspath Sealing Technology
12.4.13 Coating Technology
12.4.14 Combustor Aerodynamics
12.4.15 Combustion System Structures
12.4.16 Afterburner/Ductburner Aerothermodynamics
12.4.17 Frames, Duct, and Cases
12.4.18 Propulsion System Integration Technology
12.4.19 Electronic Control Technology and Diagnostics
12.4.20 Sensors, Actuators, Interfaces, and
Interconnections for Advanced Engine Control
Systems
12.4.21 Fuel Pumps
12.4.22 Electrical Power Generation
12.4.23 Inlet Technology
12.4.24 Nozzles, Thrust Vectoring, and Thrust Reversing
Technology
12.4.25 Wind Tunnel and Propulsion Test Cell Technology
12.5 Gas Turbine Propulsion for Marine Vehicle
Technology
12.5.1 Gas Turbine Engine Moisture and Particulate
Separator Systems
12.5.2 Protective Coating Technology for Marine Gas
Turbine Engines
12.5.3 Technology for Heavy Fuel Capability for Marine
Gas Turbine Engines
12.5.4 High Temperature Heat Exchanger Technology
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12.5.5 Lightweight Combined Gas and Steam Turbine
(COGAS) Systems
12.6 Other Marine Propulsion Technology
12.6.1 Composite Shafting
12.6.2 Lightweight Gearing
12.6.3 Water-Cooled and Superconducting Electrical
Machinery
12.6.4 Ship Propellers
12.6.5 Advanced Lift Fans
12.6.6 Large Advanced Waterjets
12.7 Energy Generation, Conversion and Storage
Technology
12.7.1 Photo Voltaic Cells
12.7.2 Radioactive Thermoelectric and Thermoinic
Generators
12.7.3 Fuel Cells
12.7.4 Aerospace Quality Nickel-Cadium and Nickel
Hydrogen Batteries
12.7.5 Special Purpose Primary and Reserve Batteries
12.7.6 Lithium Primary and Secondary Batteries
12.7.7 High Energy Density--High Temperature Secondary
Batteries
12.7.8 Power Conditioning
12.7.9 Advanced Flywheels for Energy Storage
13.0 OPTICAL AND LASER TECHNOLOGY
13.1 Fiber Optic Technology
13.1.1 Fiber Technology
13.1.2 Fiber Optic Cable Technology
13.1.3 Source and Detector Technology
13.1.4 Fiber Optic Connecting and Splicing Technology
13.1.5 Optical Coupler Technology
13.2 Integrated Optic Technology
13.3 Filter Technology
13.4 Mirror and Surface Technology
13.5 Dye Laser Technology
13.6 Gas Laser Technology
13.7 Semiconductor Lasei Technology
13.8 Solid-state Laser Technology
13.9 Chemical Laser Technology
14.0 SENSOR TECHNOLOGY
14.1 Infrared, Optical and UV Sensor Technology
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14.2 Passive X-Ray Sensor Technology
14.3 Conventional Acoustic Sensor Technology
14.4 Fiber Optic Sensor System Technology
14.5 Magnetometer and Magnetic Sensor Technology
14.6 Gravity Meter Technology
14.7 Radar and Related Technology
14.7.1 Systems Architecture, Design and Integration
Technology
14.7.2 Transmitter Technology
14.7.3 Advance Radar Antenna Design Technology
14.7.4 Radar Receiver Technology
14.7.5 Signal Processing Technology
14.7.6 Display Technology
14.7.7 Radar Absorbing Material Technology
15.0 UNDERSEA SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY
15.1 Undersea Acoustic Technology
15.1.1 Acoustic Propagation, Modeling, and Forecasting
Technology
15.1.2 Acoustic Reception Technology
15.1.3 Acoustic Transmission Technology
15.1.4 Acoustic Display Technology
15.2 Platform Acoustic Technology
15.3 Heavy Lift Salvage Technology
15.4 Deep Sea Sensor Implantation Technology
15.5 Research Facility Technology
16.0 CHEMICAL TECHNOLOGY
16.1 Polymeric Material Technology
16.2 Hydraulic Fluid Technology
16.3 Synthetic Lubricating Oil and Grease Technology
16.4 Synthetic Elastomer Technology
16.5 Atmospheric Purification Technology
Source: U.S. Department of Defense, The Military Critical
Technologies List, Office of the Under Secretary of




Coproduction: Agreements between governments that permit
a foreign government or producer to acquire the technical
information to manufacture all or part of a U.S. defense
article overseas. It includes government to government
licensed production.
Licensed Production; Overseas production of U.S. origin
defense articles based upon the transfer of technical
information under direct commercial arrangements between a
U.S. manufacturer and a foreign government or producer.
Subcontractor Production: Overseas production of a part or
component of a U.S. origin defense article. The
subcontract does not necessarily include license of
technical information. This type of production is usually
a direct commercial arrangement between a U.S. manufacturer




Investment arising from the offset
agreement, taking the form of capital invested to establish
or expand a subsidiary or joint venture in the foreign
land.
Technology Transfer; Transfer of technology that occurs as
a result of an offset agreement (other than coproduction
and licensed production) that may take the form of research
and development conducted in the buyer country, technical
assistance provided to the subsidiary or joint venture, or
other activities under direct commercial arrangements
between the U.S. manufacturer and the foreign entity.
Countertrade
;
The term is used here to describe all
agreements including the reciprocal purchase of civil or
defense goods and services from the foreign entity as a
condition of sale of military related ev.ports. The
principals in those arrangements usually are a firm in a
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developed country and a foreign government or company.
Conn^-ert rade agreements take the same general form in
civilian and military sectors.
Barter
;
A one-time transaction bound under a single
contract that specifies the exchange of selected goods or
services of equivalent value without the use of currencies.
Barter is used in the international arms trade. In these
arrangements, money may be exchanged, but the seller, under
separate contract, agrees either to buy a product from the
customer or find an export market for his product.
Counter purchase: An agreement by the initial exporter to
buy, or find a buyer for, a specified value of unrelated
goods from the original importer during a specified time
period. In this form of reciprocal trade, a company sells





An agreement by the original exporter to
accept, as full or partial repayment, goods derived from
the original exported product, such as electronic
components produced from a certain machine. Agreements for
repayment in related goods are often referred to as "buy-
backs" .
Switch: Switch trading occurs when one party to a
countertrade agreement (usually the original seller) cannot
use or sell goods contracted for. Purchase options for the
goods are sold by the original buyer at a discount to
specialists known as switch traders to dispose of the
goods on the international market.
Source: U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Exports:
Analysis of Interagency Study on Trade Offsets, GAO/NSIAD-
86-99-BR, April 1986, Appendix II.
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